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Abstract 
This study is devoted to technology transfer from the West (primarily from Finland) to 
the Soviet forestry industry during a period of rapid modernization under the rule of Nikita 
Khrushchev during the 1950s and 1960s. Under Khrushchev, the USSR sought to “catch up and 
overtake America”. However, in the post-war period the Soviet Union suffered from a dearth of 
technology and expertise, and technology transfer from more developed foreign industries 
became a crucial aspect of modernization. Despite geopolitical competition and a vast 
ideological divide, Khrushchev aimed to transfer updated Western technologies to the USSR in 
different forms and practices. The Soviet Union established scientific-technical connections with 
several countries.  The main source of modern technologies and machinery needed for paper and 
pulp production in particular was neutral Finland, which could be considered as “a window” to 
Western technological achievements for the Soviet Union. Exemplifying unique relations of 
West and East in the Cold War, Finland sold many techniques and provided expertise within the 
framework of scientific-technical cooperation. 
This dissertation examines the role that technology transfer from the other side of the Iron 
Curtain played in Soviet modernization from 1955 to 1964. How did technical cooperation with 
a Western country develop in the context of the Cold War? How and in what forms did Soviet 
institutions and engineers transfer technologies? How did they deal with more advanced 
machinery and new expertise? How did they apply the new technologies and how did Soviet 
domestic research develop? Did these technologies help renew machinery, launch new 
production and enhance the development of the industry, as expected? If not, why? And, in 
general, did these foreign technologies lead to technological modernization? In answering these 
questions, the dissertation sometimes refers to previous periods in order to trace continuities and 
change.  
Examining a vast collection of archival and published sources and using methods of the 
history of technology, the dissertation is focused on the forestry industry, which was one of key 
fields for expected positive changes in Khrushchev`s modernization. Its technological 
improvement was necessary not only for the increase of pulp and paper production to meet 
expanding consumption demands; the forestry industry was also a supplier for a large number of 
other both civilian and military industries, the latter of which received particular importance 
during the Cold War. Several plants and factories annexed after the Second Would War (in 
particular from Finland and the Baltic states) provided for the production of new sorts of pulp 
4 
 
needed for military use, and technological modernization of these factories as well as launching 
new production in other Soviet enterprises was seen as a crucial action for the development of 
many other industries. Cold War forestry technologies, thus, exemplified their capacity to be “a 
site of exchange”, enabling cooperation among different industries, engineers, scientists and 
institutions. 
 The dissertation illustrates that technologies from Finland and from the West via Finland 
played a significant role in the Soviet economy while creating a need for continuing transfer. The 
Soviet leadership aimed to create its own innovations to launch domestic production of the 
newest technologies.  While Soviet engineers succeeded in implementing some technologies, 
they failed to develop Soviet ones. The Soviet industry remained dependent on cooperation with 
countries with more advanced industry. The main reasons for this were shortages of raw 
materials. In addition, technical expertise in industrial enterprises contributed to this dependence.  
Additionally, within the USSR, there were barriers to technology transfer between institutions.  
Generally, the successful implementation of Western technologies was possible only when all 
the details, machinery and expertise, needed for the technology were transferred. At the same 
time, as a framework for cultural encounters, transfer entailed cultural impacts on Soviet 
engineers which helped them become more reflexive about work conditions and management 
practices at Soviet enterprises. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Tämä väitöskirja tarkastelee teknologian siirtoa länsimaista (erityisesti Suomesta) 
Neuvostoliiton metsäteollisuuteen Nikita Hruštšovin modernisaatiopolitiikan kaudella 1950- ja 
1960-luvuilla. Ajanjakso on merkittävä osa Neuvostoliiton modernisaation historiaa, sillä 
aikakautta leimasivat erilaiset suunnitelmat ja pyrkimykset “saavuttaa ja ohittaa Amerikka”. 
Toisen maailmasodan jälkeen Neuvostoliitto oli länsimaisia kilpailijoitaan jäljessä teknillisessä 
osaamisessa sekä uusien ja edistyneiden tekniikoiden kehittämisessä. Siksi teknologian siirtoa 
kehittyneistä talouksista pidettiin tärkeänä keinona Neuvostoliiton vanhakantaisen 
metsäteollisuuden uudistamisessa. ”Lännen” ja ”idän” kilpailusta ja ideologisesta 
vastakkainasettelusta huolimatta Hruštšovin politiikka pyrki tuomaan maahan länsimaisia 
teknologioita eri muodoissaan. Vaikka Neuvostoliitto solmi sopimuksia tieteellis-teknillisestä 
yhteistyöstä eri valtioiden kanssa, oli sellu- ja paperiteollisuudessa modernin teknologian 
päälähteenä puolueeton Suomi, joka oli Neuvostoliitolle “ikkuna” lännen teknologiaan. 
Myydessään Neuvostoliitolle suuren määrän tekniikoita clearing-kaupalla ja tarjotessaan 
asiantuntijuutta tieteellis-teknologiseen yhteistyöhön puitteissa Suomi oli ainutkertainen 
esimerkki kylmän sodan itä-länsisuhteista. 
Väitöskirjassa tutkitaan, mikä merkitys teknologian siirolla rautaesiripun yli oli 
Neuvostoliiton metsäteollisuuden modernisaatiossa vuosina 1955–1964. Miten teknillinen 
yhteistyö Neuvostoliiton ja länsimaan välillä oli organisoitu kylmän sodan kontekstissa? Millä 
tavoin ja missä muodoissa neuvostoliittolaiset instituutiot ja insinöörit tuottivat maahan uusia 
teknologioita? Miten pidemmälle kehitettyjä koneistoja ja uudenlaista asiantuntijuutta otettiin 
käyttöön? Miten moderneja teknologioita kyettiin hyödyntämään Neuvostoliiton olosuhteissa, ja 
miten kansallinen tutkimus Neuvostoliitossa kehittyi? Auttoivatko maahan tuodut teknologiat 
uudistamaan koneistoja, käynnistämään uutta tuotantoa ja kehittämään teollisuudenaloja, kuten 
oli odotettu, ja miksi? Kykenikö Neuvostoliitto kaiken kaikkiaan modernisoimaan teollisuuttansa 
näissä olosuhteissa? Vastatessaan edellä mainittuihin kysymyksiin tutkimus sivuaa myös 
varhaisempia ajanjaksoja ja pyrkii näin nostamaan esille jatkuvuuksia ja katkoksia eri 
historiallisten vaiheiden ja prosessien välillä. 
Tutkimus nojaa laajaan arkistoaineistojen ja julkaistujen lähteiden kokonaisuuteen ja sen 
pääkohteena on metsäteollisuus, joka oli Hruštšovin modernisaatiokauden avainaloja ja monien 
odotusten perusta. Neuvostoliitossa uskottiin, että maan teknologinen edistyminen oli 
välttämätöntä paperin ja selluloosan tuotannon kasvattamiseksi sekä näiden tuotteiden 
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kulutukseen liittyvien vaatimusten täyttämiseksi. Tämän ohella metsäteollisuus toimi 
puolivalmisteiden toimittajana useammalle siviili- ja sotateollisuusalalle, joista jälkimmäiset 
olivat erityisen merkittävässä asemassa kylmän sodan aikana. Neuvostoliiton alueisiin toisen 
maailmansodan jälkeen liitetyt tuotantolaitokset (erityisesti Suomesta ja Baltian maista) tekivät 
mahdolliseksi uudentyyppisen sellun tuotannon.  Näiden tuotantolaitosten modernisoiminen ja 
tuotannon käynnistäminen muualla maassa katsottiin ratkaisevaksi tekijäksi myös muiden 
teollisuudenalojen kehittämisessä. Kylmän sodan metsäteollisuuden teknologioita tuleekin 
tarkastella eräänlaisina vaihdon areenoina (“a site of exchange”), jotka mahdollistivat eri 
toimialojen, insinöörien, tieteenharjoittajien ja instituutioiden yhteistyön.  
Tämä tutkimus havainnollistaa suomalaisten ja Suomen kautta tuotujen länsimaisten 
teknologioiden merkittävää roolia Neuvostoliiton taloudessa, joka kuitenkin lopulta jäi 
teknologian siirrosta riippuvaiseksi. Vaikka neuvostojohdon pyrkimyksenä oli luoda oma 
teknologinen perusosaaminen ja siihen nojaava modernien teknologioiden tuotanto, menestyivät 
neuvostoliittolaiset insinöörit lähinnä länsivalloista tuotujen teknologioiden käyttöönotossa mutta 
eivät omien teknologioiden kehittämisessä. Neuvostoliton teollisuus jäi riippuvaiseksi 
yhteistyöstä muiden maiden kanssa. Pääsyynä tähän oli tuotantolaitosten puutteellinen 
varustaminen raaka-aineilla sekä raja-aidat instituutioiden välillä. Teknologioita pystyttiin 
ottamaan käyttöön onnistuneesti vain silloin, kun kaikki teknilliset yksityiskohdat, koneistot ja 
teknologian hyödyntämiseen vaadittava asiantuntijuus siirrettiin. Huomionarvoista on myös se, 
että teknologian siirto eräänlaisena kulttuurisen kohtaamisen muotona vaikutti insinöörien ja 
tieteenharjoittajien ajatteluun ja antoi heille uudenlaisia lähtökohtia tarkastella johtamista ja 
työelämän käytäntöjä neuvostojärjestelmässä. 
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1. Introduction 
«Comrades! We live in a wonderful epoch»1 
Nikita Khrushchev 
 
In 1959, at the 21st meeting of the Soviet Party, the Soviet First Secretary Nikita 
Khrushchev gave a speech entitled “About the key figures of the development of the national 
economy in the USSR 1959 - 1969”. While describing how wonderful things were in the USSR, 
he declared that communism would be built soon in the Soviet Union. He predicted the rapid 
development of Soviet industries, including the most problematic sectors such as, among others, 
the forestry industry, consumer goods manufacturing, and agriculture. Khrushchev’s enthusiasm 
for a better future can be explained by technological achievements and promises, which 
constituted, as the Soviet leader believed, the material base required for achieving communism.  
After launching Sputnik in 1957, Khrushchev`s proclamation that the Soviet Union was 
able to “realize the most daring dreams of humanity” seemed to be true.2 Indeed, this period was 
a remarkable time for technological development both in the Soviet Union and in other countries. 
There were substantial changes and rapid technological developments in computing, space 
engineering, light industry and consumption, and chemistry. Internationally, they had impacts on 
other industries, stimulating innovations, in particular in the forestry industry. For example, there 
were the processes of automatization of pulp making due to the development of computer 
science; manufacturing new types of cellulose due to chemical advancement; making special 
types of paper for butter and milk packaging, among others. In the Soviet Union, however, 
technological achievements in some fields, such as space engineering and the military 
technology, went together with technological backwardness in others, like forestry industry and 
agriculture. While the former technologies were highly advanced and often the subject of great 
concern of Western rivals,3 the latter ones were not competitive and the Soviet leadership strove 
to upgrade them through its modernization program. Khrushchev`s modernization strategy 
                                                     
1 Vneocherednoi XXI s`ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, 27 ianvaria-5 fevraliia 1959 g. 
Stenograficheski otchet (1959). T. 1, Moskva, p. 119. 
2 Ibidem. 
3 Among the most well known examples of such a concern is Nelson, R. (1959). The Simple Economics of Basic 
Scientific Research. Journal of Political Economy, 67(3), pp. 297-306. He argued that the launch of Sputnik had 
illustrated that the USA did not allocate enough resources to basic scientific research. See more on US university 
research in the Cold War in Lowen, R. (1997). Creating the Cold War University. Berkeley.  
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sought to develop outdated Soviet industries based on the technological achievements of other 
countries while stimulating domestic innovations.4 
Many historians have addressed, as described in chapter 4, the roles of technology 
transfer in Soviet technological and economic modernization. At the same time, this topic still 
presents a few lacunas, especially when we speak about marginalized industrial branches. In 
addition, there are still many questions related to the Soviet use of Western technologies that 
were transferred to the USSR despite the ideological confrontation between East and West in the 
Cold War. Western expertise was actively used during the whole Soviet epoch, i.e. in Stalin`s 
industrialization, during the war of 1941-1944 and afterwards.5During the East-West 
confrontation in the post-war period, it was mainly brought to the USSR in the framework of 
official cooperation agreements with capitalist counties.6 Transferred technologies were 
embedded into techniques, equipment, and know-how and they played a significant role in both 
launching new production and developing existing manufacturing. Examining these processes – 
the transfer and implementation of Western technologies as part of Soviet modernization under 
Khrushchev - helps explain a vast array of themes such as the development of the Soviet 
industrial sector and innovations, Soviet resource use, communications of Soviet engineers and 
scientists, Soviet technological politics and East-West communications on different levels across 
the Iron Curtain, among others (see a layout of the thesis in appendix 5).  
Focusing on these issues, this dissertation examines technology transfer from Finland to 
the Soviet Union, based on the example of the Soviet forestry industry, a backward industry 
which became a focus of modernization under Khrushchev and gained more applications in the 
military sector in the Cold War. Finland, a neighboring country and partner of the USSR, 
provided a large number of forestry industry technologies and techniques brought via trade and 
scientific-technical cooperation. This dissertation explains the ways in which Soviet research and 
trade organizations as well as engineers and industrial scientists transferred and implemented 
Finnish technologies in order to explain Soviet technological modernization as well as the 
outcomes of these transfers. 
                                                     
4 See more in Kangaspuro, M. and Smith, J. (2006). Introduction. In M. Kangaspuro and J. Smith, eds., 
Modernization in Russia since 1900, Helsinki, pp. 11–20. 
5 Cohen, Y. (2010). Circulatory Localities. Kritika, 11(1), pp. 11-45, among others. See more on Soviet fascination 
with America in Ball, A. (2003). Imagining America. Lanham. 
6 Gould-Davies, N. (2003). The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy. Diplomatic History (27) 2, p. 207. 
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2. Study objectives and research questions 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to examine technology transfer from Finland to the Soviet 
forestry industry during the Khrushchev`s modernization project. In so doing, I examine concrete 
practices of transferring, using and implementing Western technologies and their effects for 
modernization. This thesis, thus, investigates technological processes and their changes due to 
political, social, and cultural factors. 
This implies answering several sets of research questions such as: 
1) Soviet modernization in the forestry industry: 
-How did the Soviet forestry industry develop and what were the reasons for its 
backwardness in the 1950s and 1960s? 
-What were the specifics of Soviet resource use? What were its environmental 
consequences? 
-In general, was the Soviet industry capable of modernizing? 
2) East-West cooperation and technology transfer: 
- How did technical cooperation with a Western country develop in the context of the 
Cold War?  
-In what ways and forms did Soviet institutions and engineers transfer technologies? 
-What were the cultural impacts of transfer and encounters between Soviet and Finnish 
engineers, scientists, and traders across the Iron Curtain? 
3) Soviet innovations and implementation of Western technologies: 
-What were Soviet technological innovations and what were the reasons for insufficient 
innovations in the forestry industry? 
-How did Soviet engineers and industrial scientists deal with more sophisticated 
machinery and new expertise?  
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- How did they apply received technologies in the Soviet sphere? 
-Did these technologies help renew machinery, launch new productions and enhance the 
development of industry, as was expected, and, if not, why?  
My thesis is built around four peer-reviewed articles grouped into two main parts:  
 
-mechanisms and practices of transfer (in what forms, by whom and how) and their 
effects (articles I and II) 
-implementation and results (articles III and IV)  
 
The thesis considers the technological modernization of the Soviet forestry industry 
through an interdisciplinary lens, examining the social and economic developments of the Soviet 
Union from the perspective of technology in its interplay with cultural, political and 
environmental factors. To varying degrees, this analysis relies upon the approaches of the history 
of technology and environmental history, economic and political history, and the history of 
science, which are all, in essence, interdisciplinary fields. Yet, this study is structured as a 
history of technology, which is relatively undeveloped within Soviet history. This approach 
enables me to contribute to the history of technology transfers from the capitalist to the socialist 
bloc, while also examining domestic innovation as part of technological modernization. 
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3. Background 
 
3.1. The Soviet modernization project of 1955-1964 
 
In general terms, Khrushchev`s modernization aimed to enhance Soviet technological 
development, including transforming industries that had long been ineffective. In the 1950s and 
1960s, modernization became a frequently used word by actors on a variety of levels (see a 
discussion of the actors of this thesis in chapter 5). Officials and industry scientists, engineers 
and workers, used it when referring to different technologies and efforts to stimulate the 
development of specific industries.7 In official Soviet pronouncements, the frequently used 
concept ‘scientific-technical revolution’ became “a defining characteristic of socialist 
modernity.”8  
Technological modernization is the focus of this thesis. Technological modernization 
entails actions taken to improve technology and innovations to achieve increasing sophistication 
with time. While addressing the literature on various cultural, political, and economic aspects of 
modernization, this thesis is focused on innovation and technology transfers as part of 
technological modernization. In the language of Soviet politicians, engineers, and industrial 
scientists, “to modernize” was a synonym for “to improve” or “to make more advanced.”9 This 
work accepts that, as Sari Autio-Sarasmo puts it, modernization implied making technologies 
more advanced in order to “transform extensive economic growth into intensive growth.”10 
Nevertheless, this examination of technological modernization does not treat technology as “a 
matter in itself”, but something influenced by and simultaneously influencing society. Because 
of its nonlinearity, the process of technological modernization is always connected to social, 
cultural and political changes.11 Modernization of technology was important in building Soviet 
modernity and was part and parcel of the Soviet vision of the future.12 
                                                     
7 Kochetkova, E. (2014). Tekhnologicheskaia modernizatsiia v SSSR v 1950-e-1960-e gg. Vestnik Permskogo 
universiteta, 24(1), pp. 194-205. 
8 Reid, S. (2005). The Khrushchev Kitchen. Journal of Contemporary History, 40(2), p. 290. 
9 Kochetkova, E. Op. cit. 
10Autio-Sarasmo, S. (2011). Knowledge through the Iron Curtain. In S. Autio-Sarasmo and Miklóssy, K., eds., 
Reassessing Cold War Europe. London and New York, p. 66.  
11 Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy. New York, p. 5.  
12 This thesis does not enter a large discussion on the essence of modernity, but examines technological 
developments that took place in the Soviet industry in the 1950s – 1960s.  See more on modernity in Arnason, J. 
(2000). “Communism and Modernity.” Daedalus, 129(1), pp. 61-90; Eisenstadt, S.N. “Multiple Modernities.” 
Daedalus, 129(1), pp. 1-29 and David-Fox, M. (2015). Crossing Borders. Pittsburg. See more on socialist modernity 
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As early as in May 1955, the aims of modernization were set by a decree of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. This decree, titled 
“On the Improvement of Studying and Implementing the Experience and Achievements of the 
Advanced Domestic and Foreign Techniques,” stated the need to introduce the latest 
achievements of “advanced science and technology” as well as to produce cheaper and more 
sophisticated materials and goods.13 The Soviet project of modernization aimed to develop a 
more innovative base for competitive production as well as more rational ways of using 
resources.  
In practice, however, the modernization process was not so straightforward. The Soviet 
industry might be seen as a “space of modernity,”14 which was not just a matter of simply 
“catching up with the West” as the Soviet leader declared and countless lower level officials and 
actors repeated. It was a multi-faceted undertaking which was realized unevenly and in different 
ways in different industries and even within the same industries. To illustrate this, I will look at 
the micro level and examine in closer detail the subject of this dissertation: the forestry industry. 
In some cases, as in the production of viscose pulp, Soviet engineers proved able to advance 
technology within the domestic context. In other cases, success was based on the implementation 
of Western technologies, as in the case of bleached non-viscose pulp. The development of other 
technologies failed domestically. Instead, as in the case of continuous pulp cooking, production 
depended on the use of Western technology. Some technologies, like wood-cutting machines, 
were dependent on Western supplies which required foreign technical components. Finally, as 
was the case with pulp made from wood wastes and annual plants, some technologies failed and 
Western experience did not provide solutions. The methods and results of technological 
modernization were, thus, diverse and uneven.  
The Soviet leadership’s drive to produce more materials of better quality at a faster pace 
led to the introduction of new technologies. In many cases, as article III illustrates, the intense 
focus on fulfilling the plan impeded long-term investment in innovation.  
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In the planned economy, modernization was centralized and economic management was 
politicized.15 Although a vast number of actors at different levels were involved, the institution 
with central responsibility was the State Committee of the Council of Ministers on New 
Techniques (Gostekhnika SSSR). After its creation in 1948 to stimulate the development of new 
technologies, the Committee was reorganized many times. It was closed in 1951 and then 
reopened in 1955. Like the previous version and like similar, later, institutions, it was 
responsible for, among other functions, examining and implementing Soviet and foreign 
technologies and publishing scientific-technical works. With several departments based in 
different industrial branches, it played an important role in stimulating technological 
development in factories and research institutions. The modernization and innovation process 
was, thus, inspired and coordinated by the state through central institutions. In general, as Martin 
Kragh puts it, “a number of functions that in market economies can be found at the level of the 
firm – marketing, distribution and R&D – were in the Soviet system either wholly absent or 
organized at a higher administrative level”.16  
As part of state ideology, modernization meant much more than the benefits of 
technological development in the USSR. It aimed to exemplify the technological strength of the 
Soviet regime in the age of competition with the West. Making the state strong in order to be 
able to dominate economically and militarily was important.17  Vladimir Kontorovich and 
Alexander Wein illustrate that Soviet textbooks and readers rarely mentioned the military when 
speaking about the objectives of Soviet economic development. But, as their research has 
illustrated, throughout the lifespan of the Soviet regime, military might was the state’s primary 
objective.18  The forestry industry and, above all, the pulp-making sector was an important factor 
in increasing the military capacity of the state. At the same time, as the historian Hugh Slotten 
writes, “the Cold War involved not only a quest for military superiority but also an effort to 
demonstrate national preeminence in science and technology as a means of asserting global 
political leadership”.19 Indeed, like the United States, the Soviet leadership held the conviction 
that the Soviet political and social system “was the best model for the development for human 
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societies.”20 It was expected that society would arrive at communism in twenty years.  The 
Soviet leadership saw modernization as a rapid process which had a definite time frame and 
could help the Soviet Union take the lead in the international technological competition. For this 
reason, this thesis examines Khrushchev`s modernization as a project which looked to a future 
well beyond the time that Khrushchev was in power. In other words, the modernization project 
of 1955-1964 is defined in this dissertation by a political timeframe. This was a period when 
Soviet research institutes and enterprises aimed to increase the volumes of production and 
introduce new technologies to industry in order to beat the West and achieve full communism.  
Still, Khrushchev`s modernization project had many connections with earlier and later 
Soviet technological developments.  It resumed and continued previous projects, many of which 
had been stopped by the war. Indeed, as Alexandr Pyzhikov argues, many of Khrushchev`s 
statements and goals originated from the late Stalin years and even earlier.21 As article IV 
mentions, modernization in the 1950s and 1960s was a return to many earlier ideas about new 
ways of production and the “non-capitalist experiment” in economic catch-up, ideas that 
originated in the 1920s and 1930s or even earlier. For example, using wood wastes and annual 
plants for making pulp and pulp-based products was a return to the idea from the 1930s about the 
complex use of resources. It meant that all parts of the tree should be used for manufacturing and 
should, thus, solve the problem of insufficient cuttings and wasteful wood harvesting. Article III 
presents an even more complicated picture dealing with continuous pulp cooking, which was 
invented by Soviet engineer Leonid Zherebov as early as in the mid-1930s (while he offered the 
first vision of this innovation several decades earlier). Despite many attempts to translate 
successful experiments into industrial production in the 1940s, under Khrushchev, the project 
was scrapped and similar Swedish equipment was purchased and used instead. In addition, the 
end of the epoch did not end innovation or the development of technological processes. Practices 
like automatization, using wood wastes to make pulp, and many others, continued. The impulses 
of the epoch were slow to die out and remained influential after 1964. 
The processes of modernization were, thus, diverse and dependent on many factors 
related to the specifics of the Soviet technological and economic system. Those processes were 
defined by the interactions of industrial and research organizations, as well as their 
communication with the structures which supplied funding, techniques, and raw materials. The 
general aim of technological modernization was to make Soviet industry highly developed due to 
the use of sophisticated technologies.    
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3.2. Soviet forests and forestry industry  
 
This thesis proposes to examine as a technological system different operations of wood 
harvesting, wood working, and wood processing led by different branches of the forestry 
industry (pulp and paper, cardboard-making and other industries, as well as industries supplying 
wood, chemicals and techniques). All the processes contributed to the same technological project 
which implied that different bodies – factories, wood harvesting operations and timber mills, as 
well as research institutions and producers of techniques - should interact and cooperate. Some 
industries were dependent on others, as paper was dependant on pulp and both were dependent 
on wood supplies. For example, pulp production requires harvesting wood which, in turn, 
requires organizing forest infrastructure, creating techniques for cutting, transportation, and 
storing raw materials, establishing technological processes for disintegrating wood into 
constituent parts, and cooking, washing and packaging pulp. Forests and all the technologies 
related to their industrial use were, therefore, a vital component of the same technological 
system. The progress of the system as a whole, thus, depended on the performance of its all 
components. Planned manufacturing was, thus, “a plan of outputs and their use as inputs by 
others.”22 
Modernization set a number of general aims for the development of industry in 1955-
1964. The first goals were articulated in the 1955 decree, and those related to pulp and paper 
production were reformulated in the 1960 decree “On the Measures to Overcome the 
Backwardness of the Pulp and Paper Industry.” In general, the goals stated the need for 
significant growth in the production of different pulp-based materials by advancing techniques 
and equipping industries with more modern machinery. Engineers and scientists, as well as 
workers, specified these tasks as they defined the concrete problems which slowed the 
development of the system.  
In total, the forestry industry occupied the third place in the Soviet economy based on the 
number of workers employed (on the number of industrial employees see appendix 1). But in 
terms of technological development, the forestry industry was a marginalized field during most 
of the Soviet period.  During the industrialization drive of the 1920s and 1930s, several pulp and 
paper making plants were constructed, often with foreign equipment and technology. Despite 
this, the industry’s capacity did not meet the increasing demands for pulp and pulp-based 
products for printing, food, construction, military and other industries. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
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Soviet ministries and engineers, as well as the leadership, referred to the forestry industry as 
backwards, needing improvement (or modernization); they criticized previous policies and 
developments. Thus, the 1959 decree of the Council of Ministers “On the Improvement of 
Forestry in the RSFSR” stated that forestry was poorly organized, forests were improperly cut, 
there were a lot of forest fires, etc.23 Engineers often used the fact of backwardness in the 
industry when describing the need for innovation or travel abroad. 
This thesis describes the forestry industry system as insufficient in the mid-1950s and 
illustrates that “there was a close connection between the attempt to construct socialist modernity 
and crisis”.24 Thus, article IV illustrates in detail the dysfunction of wood harvesting, the basic 
components of the forestry industry, as well as political and scientific attempts to cope with 
problems. While the Soviet Union was a leading country in terms of volume of wood harvested 
(see appendix 2), the quality of cut wood was not high due to insufficient infrastructure and 
badly organized transportation and storage. To a large extent, Soviet work in the forests relied on 
the GULAG`s involvement in harvesting. In the 1930s and 1940s, the GULAG accounted for up 
to 50 per cent of all harvesting works.25 By the beginning of Khrushchev`s modernization, forest 
operations had not improved significantly. 
As articles I and III illustrate, the production of pulp-based materials was also 
problematic. Previously, GULAG authorities often lead the construction of new pulp and paper 
factories, such as the Solikamsky sulphite pulp factory (80 percent of workers were prisoners) as 
well as the Arkhangel`ky and Segezhsky pulp and paper plants.26 These and other enterprises 
built in the industrialization of 1930s were large, high-powered, and often equipped with modern 
machines. In the early 1940s, the NKVD (the Commissariat for Internal Affairs, responsible for 
administering the main forced labor camps) also led the reconstruction of enterprises in annexed 
areas, in particular in the formerly Finnish industrial area of the Karelian Peninsula. The 
enterprises annexed from Finland, the Baltic states and Japan were well advanced 
technologically before the war. 27  By the beginning of the modernization of 1950s and 1960s, 
however, most of the machines in these enterprises became outdated and had not been renovated 
properly. While technical knowledge in the forestry industry was rapidly developing in the post-
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war years in Finland, Sweden, Canada and other countries, the Soviet forestry industry, despite 
some innovative developments, was mostly characterized by technological slowdown. For 
example, new methods of making and bleaching pulp, manufacturing whiter and firmer paper, 
new types of packages, cardboard and other goods were critical problems in the Soviet system. 
In addition, the consistent problem in production was the lack of professionals in the field. 
Managers and workers usually remained unmotivated, and as Joseph Berliner puts it, “managers 
systematically conceal their true production capacity from the planners, produce unplanned types 
of products, and falsify the volume and quality of production”.28 When the need to fulfill the 
plan was pressing, the system could not cope with the tasks because of technological drawbacks, 
delays in supplies of raw materials, lack of qualified workers, and the prioritization of quantity 
over quality.  In some cases, the numbers were completely fabricated.29  
It is crucial to note here that the dysfunctions of the system did not appear in the 1950s 
and were inherited from the Stalin era. As I stated above, many technologies developed in the 
1950s and 1960s built on already existing ideas or technologies. Some problems, like the 
insufficient supply of wood for the pulp industry, appeared in the 1920s or earlier and existed 
during the whole Soviet period.  
Many of the system’s problems derived from the barriers between different parts of the 
forestry industry system. These were structural problems in the planned economy. They caused 
frequent delays in supplying factories with raw materials and technical details. In order to solve 
communication problems, the government constantly reformed the system of administration by 
changing the number of ministries and committees or passing functions from one institution to 
another. A significant change was made in the introductive of administrative reform in 1957. 
Enterprises were given to authorities of territorial organizations or sovnarkhozes. Within the new 
territorial entities were branch administrations which provided for the unification of wood 
harvesting, forestry, wood processing, and pulp and paper industries under the same 
organization. Subsequently, the Ministry of the Forestry Industry (created in 1946 and 
reorganized several times before 1957), the Ministry of the Paper and Woodworking Industry 
(created in 1954) as well as the Ministry of Silviculture (created in 1947) were reorganized in 
order to solve management deficiencies. These problems lay largely in the ministerial barriers to 
commodity exchange between enterprises.30 The main administration for forest management 
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became the Main Administration of Forestry and Protective Afforestation, which was 
responsible for forests in sovnarkhozes. In 1959, new organizations such as The Main 
Administration for Silviculture and Forest Protection or Glavleskhoz were created in the 
republics of the USSR except the Belorussian Republic.31 Thus multifunctional organizations 
concentrated on wood harvesting, forest protection and other tasks (see a structural scheme of the 
forestry industry administration in appendix 4).32 Glavleskhoz should have bound forestry to the 
forestry industry, in particular by managing supplies of wood from timber mills to industrial 
enterprises. These bodies acted only in sparsely forested zones while Sovnarkhozes had the same 
functions in heavily forested areas.33 In addition, in 1962, the Committee of the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR on Forestry Industry, Pulp and Paper and Woodworking Industries and 
Forestry was created.  
In total, if we believe the reports of annual inspections of forests, timber mills and 
industrial enterprises, such reorganizations were not effective. In fact, they did not stimulate 
innovations and the earlier problems of wood supplies and technology as well as the problems of 
communication between different institutions and organizations remained. Moving the functions 
from one body to another was rather a formality and did not change the essential problems of the 
industry and forest management. This thesis is focused on internal processes of the development 
of the system, paying attention to the evolution of technology and innovation and the reasons for 
the slowness of that evolution.  
 
3.3. Soviet technology and innovation  
 
In general terms, technology is knowledge which combines material aspects (techniques) 
and non-material aspects (know-how). The development of industrial technology happens 
through innovations and depends on many factors, but first of all on the primary social actors – 
engineers and industrial scientists as well as workers. The Soviet epoch, starting from the 1930s, 
saw a movement towards active innovation called rationalization and inventiveness 
(ratsionalizatorstvo i izobretatel`stvo) as well as towards new methods to speed up work.34 
Starting from the 1930s on, the state encouraged so-called inventors and rationalizers, especially 
among workers, to make small inventions to help speed up production and manufacture more 
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materials. Archival sources are full of such examples, often describing inventions which helped 
the workers cope with the outdated techniques and the lack of materials. The movement was 
directed to making production faster, a dominant aim of the Soviet epoch.35 
At the same time, the number of inventions which were put into production was very 
small. In other words, the process of making invention into innovation was problematic and 
episodic. As Loren Graham has recently argued, this tendency was (and still is) a chronic one: 
there were a lot of bright inventors in the Russian Empire and the USSR, but their inventions 
were not translated into production or spread throughout the society or industry.36 There are a 
number of explanations for this phenomenon. Graham, for example, argue that liberalizing 
economic and social reforms was necessary.37 At the same time, some innovations were 
successful, like those in the military sphere or early Soviet medicine, which means that the 
political and economic system as such is not an adequate explanation. Moreover, a case 
examined in this dissertation illustrates that some inventions were not just simply shelved, but 
that state and engineers allocated large material and social resources to their development over a 
long period of time. Thus, article III discusses in detail the invention of Leonid Zherebov, which 
was seen as promising by state officials although not by some engineers, and which remained on 
the agenda for more than 20 years.38 
This dissertation emphasizes that the forestry industry gained an additional meaning in 
the mid-20th century. In the Cold War context, dividing military and non-military technology 
became complicated.  Cold War technology gained several meanings and uses.39 As Kristine 
Bruland and Dave Mowery say, “the emergence of organized industrial research also affected the 
role of government in the innovation process, as public funding for research grew after 1945 and 
new public organizations were created to manage innovation for military and other government 
missions”.40 Article III illustrates this connection in the pulp-making industry which was a 
supplier for military aviation and gun powder manufacturing. Military connections made some 
innovations secret and in practice prevented the exchange of knowledge and wider cooperation 
among research institutions and enterprises required for developing the technology as in the case 
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of continuous pulp cooking.41 Some technologies, however, were trickier and in Alan Dobson’s 
terms, inherited chameleon-like duality; their strategic meaning depended on the situation.42 For 
instance, the forestry industry supplied the military, including the army, with packages and paper 
which were also used in the non-military sphere. This duality caused a lot of questions in the 
discussions of embargoes in the West and might be observed in the words of Khrushchev. He 
asked if buttons were strategic goods if they were used in military clothes.43 One way or another, 
secrecy was a filter which often hindered the development of innovations, especially those which 
required broader discussion and advice in non-military industries. To varying degrees in different 
periods, the scope of Soviet secrecy was broad, and there was a thorough filter on any official 
information published and transmitted in Soviet Union.44 It was not only official state censorship 
but also secrecy on the micro level, even among institutions involved in the same project but 
with different degrees of access to the secret innovation. For example, the Central Institute for 
Paper and Pulp (TsNIIB, in 1960–1964 called the All-Union Institute of Pulp and Paper Industry, 
VNIIB) was one of the leading institutions in research on pulp and paper-making technology. 
This thesis illustrates that the communication between this and similar institutions and industrial 
enterprises was not very active and complicated by the need of each to fulfill the plan set by the 
state. 
Innovations were expected to solve the problem of backwardness and facilitate 
modernization. This is why when domestic innovations did not succeed, Western technology was 
proposed to substitute for it and to solve the problem of backwardness. In many cases, for 
engineers, it was easier to start immediate production using foreign technologies, even if they 
were brought as experiments. Engineers produced and copied as many reports as possible on 
inspections of these new experimental technologies. In other words, some techniques proposed 
for imitation were installed at enterprises and used in production, not in research. In practice, 
however, innovations required time and often took place by way of trial and error.  
 
3.4. Technology transfer 
 
As modern scholarship states, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was not an autarkic 
economy, but had many connections with Western Europe, United States, African and Asian 
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43 Maksimov, А. (1999). Zapiski chernorabochego razvedki. Available at http://www.e-reading-
lib.org/chapter.php/149359/21/Maksimov_-_Operaciya__Turnir_._Zapiski_chernorabochego_razvedki.html 
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countries.45 There always were some connections between the USSR and Western countries, 
although with a different form and intensity. The post-Stalin Soviet leadership realized the need 
for more intensive communication with the outer world than had existed in the early 1950s. In 
order to win the Cold War competition, the Soviet leadership had to seek out foreign 
technologies using more channels than before. While countries of the Third World were often a 
space for implementing Soviet technological projects, the Western world was an important 
source of new technologies and techniques.  
This dissertation analyzes technology transfer as the process of bringing and 
implementing useful and more sophisticated technologies in a less developed technological 
system. Transfer entails several processes: 1) crossing national borders and the borders of 
technological systems by individuals; 2) examining foreign experience; 3) transporting material 
(techniques and artifacts) and non-material (expert knowledge and social practices) aspects of 
technologies; 4) adapting and diffusing received technologies. In these processes, both transfer 
agents and the technologies they bear are vulnerable to changes due to interaction with a wide 
variety of factors, social (other experts), cultural (other cultures as a set of practices for working 
and living, languages), technological (other technological systems), economic and political. 
More precisely, influential agents are constrained by the lack of financial and technological 
resources, specific political conditions and ineffective bureaucracies, poor infrastructures, etc. 46 
Scholars stress that there were a number of channels for transfers such as diverse forms of 
trade activities, mutual projects of construction and renovation, visits by engineers to foreign 
enterprises and research organization, purchase of literature, and espionage. For the Soviet 
modernization of 1950s and 1960s, all these forms were important. For example, technology 
transfers from Finland ranged from the purchases of Finnish woodcutters to the construction of 
the Baikal pulp and paper plant with the active participation of the Finnish company Rauma-
Repola. 
This thesis is focused on two important processes that until now have not been 
thoroughly examined in the literature. Compared to the previous epoch, these forms of transfer 
were more visible in Khrushchev`s time. Articles I and II discuss visits by Soviet forestry 
industry specialists abroad, primarily to Finland, and one aspect of trade activities, namely 
Finnish trade and industrial exhibitions held in the USSR. There were more specialists going 
abroad and more international exhibitions held in the Soviet Union than before. The main actors 
in all these activities were individuals, in particular officials who made decisions about 
purchases and sanctioned trips abroad and engineers who selected the required techniques and 
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learned new technologies from abroad. These actors were those who transported new 
technologies and those who implemented them. When travelling abroad and transferring 
technologies, they, above all industrial scientists and engineers, acquired different roles. Soviet 
specialists or delegates to foreign countries became both agents of transfer and actors promoting 
modernization; they acquired new expertise and had a responsibility for spreading and 
implementing new knowledge. The range of technologies studied in Western countries was 
broad and concerned various aspects of technological processes in wood harvesting, forest 
works, and the production of pulp-based materials. For example, the Soviets were interested in 
methods of cutting, transporting, and storing wood, technologies of bleaching pulp, new paper-
making machinery, packaging technology. Although there was a general program of 
modernization, the concrete technologies to transfer were chosen directly within enterprises and 
research institutions and were not systematized as a whole program. Instead, there were many 
separate initiatives to learn about new technologies coming from different parts of the forestry 
industry system.  
Transfer involved a number of actors at different levels.47 While this dissertation 
examines primarily specialists – engineers and industrial scientists - (depending on the context, I 
call them transfer agents, delegates, and system builders) as the key actors, articles I and II also 
consider organizational aspects of transfer. Technology transfer involved state organizations 
from the Soviet side, such as the aforementioned Gostekhnika (and similar institutions), 
ministries, trade organizations as well as the mutual Finnish-Soviet Trade Chamber, which led 
the organization of trade and industrial exhibitions, and the Finnish-Soviet Scientific-Technical 
Commission, which was responsible for travels by engineers. It also involved organizations at 
lower levels such as industrial enterprises, firms, and research organizations, which sent their 
representatives and collected the results of transfer. But finally, and most importantly, 
technology transfer was fulfilled by transfer agents or specialists (engineers and scientists) who 
visited Finnish enterprises.  
One of the key questions that follows is the impact of the process of transfer on transfer 
agents or those who crossed the Iron Curtain. As Kendall Bailes indicates, the 16th Meeting of 
the Party in 1930 claimed that “the most advanced capitalist technology should be borrowed, but 
borrowing should not necessary extend to other, particularly organizational, aspects of capitalist 
economies.”48 The same was true in the 1950s and 1960s under an ideological system that still 
did not imply bringing anything more than techniques. In other words, the Soviet leadership 
separated the social and the technological, intending to bring technologies without changing the 
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society. A relevant question was, as George Holliday formulated it, “do transfers of technology 
free the East from reliance on imports from the West, or, conversely, do they generate demand 
for complementary technologies and intermediate goods and for periodic technological 
updates?”49 As article I illustrates, transfer of technologies is about the changes of both 
technology and actors` views. In other words, while being abroad, in Finland or elsewhere, 
Soviet transfer agents saw other cultural and social environments which challenged their views 
of Soviet practices and working conditions as well as the general performance of Soviet 
technological systems. In this sense, technology transfer always means something more than just 
technology, and includes social and cultural transformations. This illustrates what Bernhard 
Irrgang says about technology transfer: in his opinion, the transfer can include three components: 
cultural transfer, technique or technology transfer, and moral or sometimes ethics transfer.50 For 
some authors, “for much of Russian history, modernization has been almost synonymous with 
westernization”.51  My analysis in article I illustrates that to a varying degrees all these 
components were transferred by Soviet engineers across the Iron Curtain. After coming back, the 
transfer agents discussed not only the forestry technologies they saw in Finland but also such 
organizational questions as wages, work hours, labor conditions, relations between workers and 
managers, and work culture. Although such discussions were not archived with great care and I 
found only a limited number of them, those that were preserved show the “unintended 
influences” which technology transfer could cause. 52 
 
3.5. The Iron Curtain and technological cooperation 
 
This dissertation begins from the thesis that the Iron Curtain was permeable and the Cold 
War was not just a confrontation between superpowers. This statement has been frequently 
articulated by the recent historiography. The modern literature, as chapter 4 illustrates, gives 
many examples of transfers, border crossings and multiple contacts between actors from two 
blocs. To a large extent, the Soviet Union maintained the impulse to increase the number of 
contacts despite the Cold War in the late Stalin years. In these years, peaceful coexistence was 
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first mentioned as a new principle of Soviet foreign politics.53 This concept was further 
developed by Khrushchev, who made it the most important vision of Soviet officialdom. In 
general terms, peaceful coexistence declared that while continuing competition in the non-
military sphere, the states should retain a focus on military competition. In fact, as the famous 
“kitchen debate” had illustrated, this competition in living standards “closely linked guns and 
kitchens.”54 The Soviet leader and officials declared their commitment to peaceful coexistence in 
their addresses to capitalist, socialist, and neutral countries. In particular, Soviet intervention in 
the decolonized countries of the Third World was often justified by mentioning cooperation and 
the Soviet desire to pursue peaceful coexistence.55  
These politics carried a number of implications. First, the Soviets desired to transfer 
technologies and purchase equipment for modernization under peaceful coexistence. As 
Khrushchev said, “if we took all the positive features of the capitalist economy and translated 
them into socialist soil, we would get socialist results.”56 This meant the belief that 
communication with the West would not bring anything ideologically unintended and it would 
be possible to differentiate technology from politics. This relates to Lauren Graham’s comments 
about Soviet and Russian innovation in his recent presentation at the Economic Forum in Saint 
Petersburg. According to him, the problem of Soviet/Russian innovative politics is the desire to 
get milk without a cow or to have sophisticated technologies without changing the social and 
political system.57 Indeed, the Soviet leadership saw technological development as a process 
separate from political development. 
Second, this intention met some obstacles in embargoes set by the capitalist bloc. 
Established in 1949 to control the flaw of strategic goods to the socialist countries, the 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) set three embargo lists 
promoted by the US government. In 1950, list 1A included 167 goods strictly prohibited for 
selling to the USSR like military, oil and chemical equipment, as well as techniques related to 
the production of atomic energy.58 In 1954, the first list included 500 items. Later, however, 
actual trade activities witness many changes despite the developing Cold War. As Alan Dobson 
writes, by the late 1950s, the embargo began to weaken and became mostly symbolic. At that 
                                                     
53 See more in Pyzhikov, A. Op. cit. 
54 Oldenziel, R., de la Bruheze, A. and de Wit, O. (2005).  Europe`s Mediation Junction. History and Technology, 
21(1), p. 109. 
55 See more on the geopolitical game in the Third World in Westard, O.A. (2007). The Global Cold War. 
Cambridge. 
56 Rosenberg, V. (2005). Soviet-American Relations, 1953–1960. Jefferson, p. 147. 
57 Graham, L. (2016). Moloko bez korovy. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T9AABp4PA_4. 
[Accessed 28 Aug. 2016]. 
58 McGlade, J. (2005). CoCom and the Containment of Western Trade and Relations. In J. Eloranta and J. Ojala, 
eds., East-West Trade and the Cold War, vol. 36, Jyväskylä, p. 49. 
30 
 
time, it was clear that the embargo had failed to retard Soviet economic development while 
embargo restrictions remained the only effective means of signaling about East-West tensions.59 
Some European industrial producers shared the leadership’s attitude of concern about the 
flow of strategic and high technology to the USSR, a potential competitor. To some extent, such 
concerns might be found in Swedish forestry newspapers in the late 1950s, the years of the peak 
of Soviet modernization. These publications mentioned significant achievements of the USSR in 
the forestry industry and the rational use of forest resources. They said that the Swedish foresters 
“would have to recognize a serious competitor in a couple of decades.”60 Such concerns could be 
explained by Soviet propaganda, or they might derive from the fact the authors could travel to 
the USSR and see the best Soviet exemplars. At the same time, there were opposite opinions. 
Other producers, in particular Paul Chambers, the head of Imperial Chemical Industries in 
Britain, argued in 1966 for the superiority of the private capitalist economy over the totalitarian 
economy. As he said, “factories… established on today`s technologies would become backward 
in several years.”61 These conclusions were probably just an assumption as the real state of 
things in the USSR, including the forestry industry, was hidden behind the Iron Curtain; those 
who came to the USSR were shown only best samples and best enterprises. But, indeed, if one 
considers the rapidly developing chemistry internationally from the 1950s-1960s on, this 
position was reasonable.  
I assume that Finnish producers had similar views on the possibility of technological 
development in the USSR. Some Finnish engineers were convinced that the Soviet industry 
lagged behind and could not provide anything useful for Finnish manufacturing. As Soviet 
specialist Kholmovskyi said, once talking with a Finnish engineer who travelled to the USSR, he 
heard that “there was nothing new to learn in the Soviet Union”. He concluded: “It is, thus, clear 
to them, that they can learn nothing new from us in the field of sawmilling.” Some respondents 
who gave interviews for my research also admitted that there was a significant gap between the 
Finnish and Soviet technological systems.62 
Different channels of technology transfer were formalized and usually took place within 
negotiated forms of cooperation between the USSR and a foreign country. In the case of Finland, 
there were two basic forms of cooperation which enabled transferring technologies from Finnish 
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industrial enterprises and research institutions to the Soviet Union. In 1950 Finland, became the 
first capitalist country to sign a five year trade agreement with the Soviet Union.63 Its share in 
Soviet imports of equipment for the forestry industry was quite significant (see appendix 3). The 
agreement continued trade activities on the bilateral basis set in 1945, now established for a 
longer time period. This meant that deals between the governments were made with no payment 
in hard currency, i.e. national money did not cross the state borders. In this exchange of goods, 
the overall cost of Finnish exported products was to correspond to the cost of Soviet goods 
evaluated in a non-convertible currency. Such payments were fulfilled by the Bank of Finland 
and the Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade (Vneshtorgbank) in rubles. Trade items were defined by 
five-year trade agreements, and additional treaties were signed every year to specify the items 
based on the current situation and the needs of each country. Additionally, in 1955, the countries 
signed an agreement on cooperation in science and technology. This agreement defined several 
forms of exchange of professional knowledge such as trips by engineers to a partner country, 
exchange of scientific-technical literature, joint conferences, and more.64 For the Soviet 
government, the trade with capitalist Finland was important in terms of showing to the world that 
the socialist system was capable of cooperating with the West. It fit with the policy of peaceful 
coexistence and demonstrated that the USSR was promoting a peaceful relationship with 
capitalist countries while simultaneously competing in agricultural, scientific, technological, and 
other non-military spheres. 
The most complicated task is to evaluate the degree to which the Soviets managed to 
transfer needed technologies and the influence of those technologies on the Soviet modernization 
project. As they discussed this difficult question, researchers provided a large number of 
interpretations. The following chapter examines a set of related questions in the Cold War and 
modernization literature. 
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4. Review of the literature 
Given that there are vast literatures on both transfers and modernization, I focused my 
dissertation research on the scholarship on technology transfers from West to East as part of 
studies on Soviet science and technology and economic performance. This part examines the key 
developments of studies on transfers with the emphasis on how approaches and views have 
changed over time, what questions have been investigated and what aspects still remain 
uncovered. This chapter examines the literature on technology transfer to the USSR in 
chronological order in order to illustrate the main tendencies in how scholars understood Soviet 
technologies, transfers and East-West interactions. It analyzes literature which deals with 
channels and results of transfer, Cold War interactions, as well as Soviet innovations.  
 
4.1. The USSR and Western technology: Views of the 
Cold War literature 
 
Technology transfers from West to East in the Cold War have been the topic of 
considerable investigation starting from the second half of the twentieth century. When the 
conflict between the Cold War blocs came into the fore, many researchers began to examine ‘the 
other’ and its internal processes. To a large extent, this interest was spurred by governments and 
the military sector, which provided a great deal of finances for research of the Soviet Union, in 
particular in the USA.65 As David Engerman shows, the establishment of the Iron Curtain in the 
late 1940s made the American government pay particular attention to studying the Soviet 
Union.66Although there was a wide range of disciplines, such as literature, language, and history, 
involved, science and technology studies were among the central concerns for those studying 
what was happening in the Eastern bloc. Technology transfer from West to East caught the 
attention of researchers, although there were not a lot of reliable sources available from the 
Soviet Union. Using materials that show quantities of technologies sent to the USSR could shed 
some light on its scientific-technological development. For instance, George Holliday, the author 
of a fundamental work on Western technologies in Soviet military capacity, mainly analyzed 
Soviet journals and volumes on trade and statistical materials.67 Indeed, “it was hard to find any 
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solid ground from which to evaluate the Soviet economy because even bad data on the Soviet 
economy were hard to come by”.68 In addition, academic and analytical works on technology 
were to provide knowledge for military authorities and for policy makers. 
The first works on technological transfers were written by Western economists and 
political scientists and were primarily focused on purchases of technical equipment by the Soviet 
Union. Written during the Cold War, they aimed to determine whether Soviet industry was 
capable of overtaking Western development using Western resources. All the papers of the 
1950s–1980s can be roughly divided into two positions: alarmist and conservative. These 
positions took differing views of the role of Western technologies in prospective Soviet 
technological and economic development. Some authors argued that Western technologies 
played a significant role in Soviet technological development and, thus, created a basis for Soviet 
competitiveness with the West. Others, the majority of researchers, stressed that the Soviet 
system was a priori incapable of technological modernization and no one attempt to bring 
Western updated technologies could contribute to it significantly. The latter position was in the 
framework of so-called totalitarianism in Soviet studies. Totalitarianism was based on the idea 
that the Soviet project was finite, did not allow any place for substantial reforms, and would 
finally result into collapse.69 
Anthony Sutton, perhaps one of the most influential researchers in the field, is the author 
of a series of volumes on East-West technology transfer published between the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. All of his three books aim to show the high degree of Soviet dependence on 
Western imports. He examines different channels of bringing Western technologies – 
concessions in the 1920s, technical-assistance agreements in the pre-war Stalin period, Lend 
Lease, large transfers from German industry and Finnish reparations in the immediate post-war 
years, as well as later imports. He argues that all the Soviet industries were built on the basis of 
copying Western technologies that had been transferred in different ways, and that it helped the 
Soviet government accumulate resources when required in critical moments (like in the case of 
rapid industrialization or withstand the Hitler`s attack). His main viewpoint, of quite alarmist 
nature, says that the West had built up Soviet industrial and military capabilities and actually 
“constructed and maintain a first-order threat to Western society”.70 These words would be 
adapted by some authors and political actors as an argument against intensive trade with the 
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Eastern bloc. Sutton also warned about the double nature of any technology: even automobile 
manufacturing equipment might contribute to the military sphere.  
 In the decades to follow, many expressed a commonly accepted idea that the Soviet 
Union was characterized by economic and technological stagnation and crises. By contrast, the 
authors of the 1950s and 1960s were inclined to describe the Soviet Union as a real danger which 
was experiencing rapid economic development. Indeed, as Philip Hanson, representative of the 
Birmingham research tradition of economic history, noted, before the early 1970s the Soviet 
economy was rarely described as in crisis. From his point of view, however, even in the 
Brezhnev era, the Soviet economy experienced stable growth, but in essence was ineffective and 
could not retain its pace without the impulses from capitalism.71It was Khrushchev who had 
allowed future stagnation as he weakened political control, on which the system was very 
dependent. This statement is close to what Russian economist Grigory Khanin proposed later as 
the main feature of the 1950s, an epoch of the “Soviet economic miracle.” He contended that it 
was the period when the Soviet Union became a superpower in terms of the military, science and 
economy. This progress was based on both domestic research and, in part, on transfers, but 
reforms (introducing the territorial principle of management or sovnarkhozy) and poorly 
organized management hindered further development. In general, Khanin holds accountable the 
unqualified actions of the Soviet leadership for preventing progress.72Quite briefly, however, he 
mentions – and it seems crucial to me - that despite the general growth of volumes, the quality of 
Soviet goods was low.73 
 Hanson examines Western imports and technology transfers. In the Khrushchev era, the 
volume of trade with the West increased many times, but this was also a period when the Soviet 
Union began to position itself as an important player in the Third World. Actually, Hanson tends 
to develop a balanced view of the role of Western technologies in the Soviet economy, arguing 
that, “to stress this reliance on foreign technology is not to denigrate Soviet indigenous RDI 
efforts”.74  He believes that parts of Soviet industries (like space engineering) were built on 
domestic potential while others (such as plastics and the chemical industry in general) were 
Western-built. Later works, based on newly opened archival materials in post-Soviet Russia, 
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argued that even the military and space success was to a large extent created due to German 
innovations transferred immediately after the war.75 
A vast part of Cold War literature, however, claimed that transfers took place widely, but 
were not decisive for Soviet economic or technological development. For instance, Marshall 
Goldman, the author of several books on the Soviet economy, considered that the USSR was “a 
more competitive threat to countries like Brazil and the Philippines with their low technology 
items than to the OECD countries [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development] 
with their more sophisticated products”.76 He tried to prove that the Soviet Union lagged behind 
and could not be a real threat to the West, even if it received a lot of Western technologies. 
Timothy Luke, professor of political science at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, even proposed 
to examine the Soviet Union as an “underdeveloped superpower”. Applying the world-system 
approach, he placed the Soviet Union into the semi-peripheral niche, which was dependant 
technologically and industrially. He said that Soviet industry could not accumulate the resources 
of more advanced superpowers in away that could help them catch up the developed societies.77 
Angela Stent, a foreign policy expert, has contended that the basic problem of all the 
socialist countries lay in that their systems “could not absorb and diffuse Western technology 
efficiently” and “the cost of some technology imports may have been more than the benefit”.78 
She wrote that even if a country of CMEA would buy all the computers it wished, it could not 
achieve optimal use of them because socialist systems did not provide an access for innovations. 
Thus, it was a system that could consume the results of innovations, but not adapt innovations 
themselves.79 Professor Daniel Burghart in his monograph “Red Microchip”, devoted to the 
computer industry, explained it more explicitly. He said that transfer of any technology basically 
requires appropriate infrastructure. In other words, sending a car into a country that had no 
proper roads, fuel, or manufacturing of details would have a negligible effect. In addition, the 
recipient society should be “capable of recreating the technology or building upon it”.80He also 
considered the channels of transfer and espionage as one of the most productive ways of 
knowing about capitalist technologies. Similar conclusions were drawn in works on other cases. 
For example, the Soviet forestry industry and technology transfer was examined in Brenton Barr 
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and Kathleen Braden’s monograph. They stressed that selling wood helped finance Western 
transfer in the post-war years. Answering the main question set in the work – why, despite 
technology transfer, the Soviet forestry sector remained backward – the authors stressed the lack 
of investment and ineffective organization of the industry.81 These authors, thus, emphasized the 
incapability of the Soviet system and its key elements to adapt technologies and work on its own. 
Inefficient management and lack of infrastructure only made things worse. 
Kendall Bailes devoted his research to transfers, the implementation of adopted 
technologies, and research development in the Soviet Union. Although his works are focused 
primarily on transfers from the USA before WWII, many of his conclusions are applicable to 
later periods. He wrote that the Soviet government understood the competitive nature of 
capitalism and played off capitalist firms in their competition with each other.82 The Soviets 
were very selective in choosing Western experience and chose only the most authoritarian 
methods (like Taylorism), but rejected American commercial ones.83 This showed that the Soviet 
government under Stalin strove for independence and the development of its own research. The 
latter, however, was not very successful because of organizational features within Soviet 
industry. Bailes argued that “the barriers to successful innovation in terms of social relations of 
the technostructure [existed] both internally and in its dealing with other major groups of Soviet 
society.”84 He listed a comprehensive set of problems with technological innovations in the 
Stalinist period such as an urgent need to adapt foreign technologies; the lack of capitalist 
competition; terror against some innovators; the ideological goal of stimulating technological 
innovation not only by the intelligentsia but by workers as well; the scarcity of skilled workers; 
the strong tradition of pure research; the organizational split between research, development and 
product; and, finally, the weak influence of economists’ innovations. The main reason, however, 
as Bailes says, lay in the disconnect between production and industrial research, as many 
scientists were focused on investigations which had little connection with the practical industrial 
sector.85 
Joseph Berliner has thoroughly described the structures of the Soviet research and 
development sector. His analysis includes the formal and informal organization of Soviet 
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enterprise, incentives and decision-making, planning and management and other components of 
the Soviet economic and technological systems. From his point of view, the problem of Soviet 
innovations was having a plan which did not correspond to current developments. In other 
words, innovations required time while the plan required acceleration and, always, the plan was 
“the first objective of management”.86 At the same time, new technology requires considerable 
new resources and new supplies. Because of problems of supplies in the planned system, 
innovations just aggravated “the already tight supply situation”. As Berliner argues, workers 
were trained to work with the already-in-use equipment and bringing new techniques and 
educating people to work with it was the responsibility of the workers themselves. This is why 
workers prevented bringing new technology and were inclined instead to renovate old 
equipment. Introducing new technologies was not promising in that the plan could be changed 
from above.87 Berliner explains the typical features of Soviet production and management, 
exploring the economic climate in which they operate.88 
In general, Cold War papers imply a strong divide between the blocs and stress the role 
of technology transfer from one side to another as an important factor of East-West interactions. 
Most works were focused on the macro level and particularly transfer through trade as part of 
state relations. Some others tried to analyze internal technological and social processes within 
the system to understand its specifics on the micro level. 
 
 
4.2. The USSR and Western technology: Modern 
conceptions 
 
In the age of perestroika and after the collapse of the Soviet regime, the focus of 
researchers shifted considerably to the question of the reformability of the Soviet economic 
system and the reasons for its collapse. The analysis mostly revolved around the last decade of 
the USSR and Gorbachev`s reforms in particular.89 From an economic perspective, the 
researchers brought to the fore the reform of the system itself. Was it capable of embracing 
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innovations? Many said that the Soviet Union would be saved not only due to technology 
transfer but by importing Western management styles and, especially after the Chinese 
transformation of socialism was realized, even by incorporating elements of the capitalist 
system. Historian Steven Kotkin, for example, argued that it was communist ideology which 
hindered Soviet economic progress and believed that the planned economy could be reformed in 
essentials without introducing full private property and market prices.90 Bringing in 
technological pieces without changing the way they were adapted was a drop in the bucket, and 
could not help the Soviet Union to compete with the West. Paul Gregory also argued that the 
problems were in the economic system itself: poor planning, lack of knowledge of planners, 
unreliable supplies, etc.91Stepping from modernist approach, Stephen Cohen took an opposing 
view in arguing that the Soviet Union was capable of reforming.92 Russian historians also gave 
their input to the discussion, addressing historical developments of Soviet technology. For 
example, the economic historian Vladimir Shestakov, discussing Soviet socio-economic policy 
in the 1950s and mid-1960s, said that borrowings from the West had always been partial and 
could not influence the economic or political system as such. He insisted that only market, civil 
society and basic changes could bring positive changes, but technological transfers just masked 
growing gaps as the Soviet Union lagged behind the West.93 
Generally speaking, however, in the years following the Soviet collapse, the second half 
of the 1990s–early 2000s, the number of papers on technology transfers decreased and the 
question seemed to lose relevance. This decline, at the same time, preceded the proliferation of 
new perspectives and approaches, both in terms of explaining Soviet technology and 
mechanisms of transfer. Also, we may find a strong focus on the micro level and increasing turn 
to examining separate cases. Despite discussing the intensity of technological transfers from 
West to East, many works of the Cold War period did not position them as something going 
beyond state level. In turn, recent researchers have argued that while the Cold War was indeed a 
confrontation on the macro level, there was widespread scientific, technological and cultural 
cooperation on the micro level, proving the permeability of the Iron Curtain. These works 
investigate the activities of individuals in order to show their roles in technological and 
economic development. The focus on interactions through the gaps in the tentative border 
between the two blocs gained tremendous importance and became seminal for many researchers. 
At the same time, other socialist states began to receive more attention and the Soviet Union is 
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not the exclusive site for research any more. Further, not only West-East but East-West transfers 
are under consideration. Among such works it is worth mentioning articles by Karen Freeze, 
showing how Czechoslovak textile technologies were developed and transferred successfully to 
the West. She proved that the centrally planned economy had positive effects, in particular in the 
textile industry as it led to integration among researchers, engineers, machine builders, and 
machine users in the textile industry. Her analysis also concluded that the Iron Curtain was 
permeable and allowed contacts between people from the two blocs.94 
Focus on the permeability and forms of interactions between individuals and small 
institutions was articulated and significantly developed within the project “Knowledge through 
the Iron Curtain – Transferring Knowledge and Technology in Cold War Europe” conducted at 
the Aleksanteri Institute in Helsinki in 2007–2009. This, as well as some other projects, put an 
emphasis on the role of small European countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain both as 
recipients and transmitters of technologies as well as intermediary actors in the interactions and 
transfers between East and West.95 
 Among the results of this new approach were papers by Sari Autio-Sarasmo, who helped 
develop the understanding of transfers and interactions in the Cold War. In the volume, 
“Reassessing Cold War Europe,” she and Katalin Miklóssy characterized the Cold War as 
interactions on the micro level which were shaped primarily in the mid-1950s and 1960s. In the 
Khrushchev era, it became apparent that the Soviet Union needed Western technological aid and, 
thus, aimed to establish more contacts with foreign countries.96 In her chapter “Knowledge 
through the Iron Curtain,” Autio-Sarasmo examined two cases of cooperation between the Soviet 
Union and Western countries – Finland and West Germany – within the sphere of scientific-
technical cooperation. She said that this kind of cooperation “proved to be highly effective” in 
terms of transferring knowledge and technology, but “the significance of these transfers in terms 
of impact on the economic modernization process or economic growth, however, remained 
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rather low”.97 Actually, the main effect of this kind of interaction, though initiated on the macro 
level, was the creation of channels for trade and multileveled cooperation among individuals and 
small groups. In other works, Autio-Sarasmo discussed Soviet modernization and the role of 
contacts between East and West. Thus, she stressed that “due to the dependence on foreign 
technology and problems in the diffusion of transferred knowledge to the Soviet system, the 
development of domestic research and development remained lower than expected”.98 She 
indicated that the main reasons for the failure of implementing transferred technologies rested 
with the poorly coordinated actions of transfer organs and recipients.99 
There were other papers, most devoted to the 1950s and 1960s, published as a result of 
the project. Thus, in his recent article the aforementioned Hanson stressed the role of individuals 
in technology transfer but showed that the economic system of the Soviet Union slowed down 
technological progress as it was not successful at adopting imported technologies.100 Jeremy 
Smith devoted his chapter to knowledge transfer in the field of wine-making from France to 
Georgia which resulted in Soviet success in the technology.101 Riikka Nisonen-Trnka examined 
transfers of medical lenses from the USA to Czechoslovakia, seeing it as a successful process.102 
This approach, thus, widened the scope of cases and topics, while, however, leaving out the 
forestry case, the focus of this dissertation. 
Many current researchers examine the question of innovation, although there are not 
many works devoted to the implementation of foreign technologies in the Soviet system. Based 
on examples from Stalin`s period, historian Sergey Zhuravlev shows that the passivity of local 
administrators hindered many promising innovations.103 Other researchers argue that state 
politics were the main barrier to innovations. Anthony Heywood’s book on the engineer Iurii 
Lomonosov, for instance, asserts that state use of terror was the main reason why some engineers 
stopped research for years on end.104  Loren Graham argues that most Russian and Soviet 
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innovations were just lonely ideas, which were not implemented because of the existing socio-
economic system which did not allow freedom, risk and reliability.105 
One of the crucial aspects appearing from the examination of East-West technological 
interactions across the Iron Curtain is non-technological influences. The dilemma of dealing with 
the Western world and acting within the conditions of Soviet ideology has been investigated in a 
vast number of works. Primarily, researchers dealt with Soviet scientists and their interactions 
with the West and Soviet ideology. Thus, Loren Graham and Jean-Michel Kantor concluded that 
Soviet mathematicians did not work for collective science, as was expected by the leadership, 
but rather that the best scientific achievements were produced by individual and theoretical 
researchers.106 Slava Gerovitch concluded that while choosing a course of action between the 
‘overtaking and surpassing’ and ‘criticizing and destroying’ strategies, computer scientists tried 
to make computers distant from ideological debates.107 In contrast, Alexey Kojevnikov argued 
that Soviet scientists adapted to the regime and played academic games, reproducing ‘public 
rituals of ‘criticism and self-criticism’ and taking part in collective formal actions in order to 
prove their loyalty to the Party.108 
Some authors stressed the influence of experience in the Weston those Soviet scientists 
who went abroad. Allen Kassof, who acted as the executive director of the International 
Research and Exchanges Board, which dealt with academic and scholarly exchanges between the 
USA and the Soviet Union, said that after Soviet and East European academics and intellectuals 
participated in exchange with the West, they faced the “basic change” which finally lead to the 
demise of the communism.109 Yale Richmond went further into cultural influences on various 
groups, exploring the changes in people`s minds. Although those who traveled abroad were elite 
members of Soviet society and had good living conditions, they compared the two sides of the 
Iron Curtain in terms of material abundance and internal freedom; some of them became very 
critical towards the Soviet reality. They often admitted the better conditions of American 
science, more updated scientific equipment and better economic performance.110 These and other 
works raise the important issue of the nature of technological transfers and the interplay of 
technological and socio-cultural aspects. This issue, also considered in this dissertation, 
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resonates with the investigation of technological development as a complicated process which 
always has social and cultural implications.111 
Despite the recognition of the importance of the micro level and the cultural 
consequences of technological transfers, analysis of the macro level still retains its position. A 
large literature examines transfers within the context of the embargo and inter-state trade as well 
as the politics of the Cold War. In this vein, Frank Cain discusses not only the effects of trade 
and transfer restrictions, but also the politics, nuances, and reactions of various governments to 
embargos, thus, bringing an explicitly political factor into trade relations. He stresses that the 
embargo expressed the American will to temper economic progress of the Eastern bloc and 
create a gap in the development of West and East of no less than ten years. However, trade 
relations, which practically included transfers, were beneficial as many countries received raw 
materials from the East.112 He illustrates the tricky nature of dual use technologies, examining 
such products as pipes and their role in political discussions of capitalist states.  
Alan Dobson stresses that in practice, as early as in the late 1950s, the embargo began to 
weaken and gained rather symbolic meaning. Actually, the Soviet Union managed to increase its 
war-making capacity and the embargo could not interrupt transfers and actually “might not 
impede Soviet technological advances and economic growth”.113 Embargo actions were a kind of 
reaction to different political realities in the relations of the blocs, “an effective means of 
signaling”. Like Cain and other authors, Dobson highlighted the question of double use 
technologies and the contradictions that arose between countries because of the difficulties 
balancing embargo and trade.114 
To sum up, the recent scholarship examines various aspects of technological 
developments in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. They discuss interactions of 
small actors, the nature of the Iron Curtain and cultural implications of technology transfers. 
Still, mechanisms of transfers and the implementation of Western technologies in the Soviet 
context require more research.  
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4.3. Soviet-Finnish cooperation and technology transfer 
 
Finland, one of the key state actors in my dissertation, was a unique player in the 
complicated scene of East-West relations. In the Cold War literature, many Soviet and Finnish 
authors stressed the role of this kind of collaboration in proving the possibility of contacts 
between two systems. This was principally important for the Soviet leadership under 
Khrushchev, who had promoted the idea of peaceful co-existence and enabled the signing of 
agreements on collaboration with Western countries. Soviet works, in particular, emphasized 
political factors in technological relations, on one hand, the peaceful politics of the post-war 
Finnish leadership, and on the other, the dovish principles of Lenin as realized by the Soviet 
government. E. Ambatzumov, for example, determined Finnish-Soviet technological cooperation 
as the practical realization of peaceful co-existence, which was beneficial for both countries. In 
particular, the USSR supplied Finland with fuel, corn and other materials, which showed that 
Soviet trade politics “had a friendly character”. At the same time, Finland played an important 
role in providing the Soviet Union with technical goods and technologies.115 Such notions as 
friendship, co-existence and mutual benefit would run through the literature of most of the rest of 
the Soviet period.116 The volume “Finnish-Soviet Economic Relations”, edited by Kari Möttölä, 
O.N. Bykov and I.S. Korotev is another example. Articles written by politicians, academics and 
researchers examine various aspects of Finnish-Soviet cooperation in the economy and related 
fields. Most authors stress the connection between politics and the economy.  
One of the authors of the volumes, Erkki Nironen, studies transfer of technologies in its 
various channels and forms such as trade, scientific-technical cooperation and cultural contacts. 
He writes that transferred technologies did not make the Soviet Union competitive with Western 
countries, but opened attractive opportunities on the Soviet market.117  In this and some other 
publications, he examined various technological projects of Finnish companies in the Soviet 
Union.118 
In the recent scholarship, the emphasis is often put on the role of Finland as a mediator 
between the blocs and its significance in transmitting Western technologies to the Soviet Union. 
Vesa Saarikoski even proposed a conception of Finland as a middle Europe (Väli-Eurooppa), 
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which benefited from both West and East.119 The unique position of Finland in East-West 
cooperation and in particular Finnish-Western relations is examined in papers of the 
aforementioned Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Niklas Jensen-Eriksen as they traced attitudes of the 
Western states towards Finland.120 Pekka Sutela developed a peculiar focus on Finnish-Soviet 
trade, its organization and practicalities. In his recent book on “Trading with the Soviet Union” 
which summarizes his previous research, Sutela treated Finnish-Soviet trade relations on macro 
and micro levels, arguing that both state and business actors saw trade with the East as highly 
profitable.121  In a number of articles, Tatiana Androsova explained the reasons for close 
Finnish-Soviet relations right after the war. She wrote that Stalin`s leadership considered Finland 
an important partner which could provide useful cooperation.122 She also put a strong emphasis 
on political crises and their influence on economic cooperation between the countries.123 
The current scholarship, thus, pays attention to a wide range of aspects, including the 
interplay of politics, economy, technology and culture on different levels. At the same time, the 
topic still requires deeper examination on the forms of transfers and implementation of 
technologies on the micro level. For example, we need to learn more about the activities of those 
who brought Western technologies in different forms (engineers’ trips, exhibitions, espionage, 
among others). The field still requires more cases of separate technologies in order to see the 
impacts of transfers on Soviet modernization as well as the impacts of various factors on 
transfers themselves. A crucial observation is that with little exception, the existing literature did 
not address the implementation of imported technologies, a central focus of this thesis.  
                                                     
119 Saarikoski, V. (2002). Between East and West. Finland and Hungary during the Cold War. In O. Vehviläinen and 
A. Pók, eds., Hungary and Finland in the XX century. Helsinki, p. 119. 
120 Jensen-Eriksen, N. (2011). CoCom and Neutrality: Western Export Control Policies, Finland and the Cold War, 
1949 –1958. In S. Autio-Sarasmo and K. Miklóssy, eds., Reassessing Cold War Europe. London and New York,  p. 
52; Jensen-Eriksen, N. (2005). Just Rhetoric? The United Kingdom and the Question of Western Economic Aid to 
Finland, 1950–1962. In J. Eloranta and J. Ojala, eds., East-West Trade and the Cold War, vol. 36. Jyväskylä, pp. 
94–111. 
121 Sutela, P. (2014). Trading with the Soviet Union, Helsinki. See also Sutela, P. (2005). Finnish Trade with the 
USSR. BOFIT Online, 7. 
122 Androsova, T.V. (1999). Finliandia v planakh SSSR kontsa 1940-h – serediny 1950-kh gg. Politiko-istoricheski 
aspect. Otechestvennaia istoriia, 6, p. 47. 
123 Androsova, T. (2011). Economic interest in Soviet Post-War Policy in Finland. In S. Autio-Sarasmo and K. 
Miklóssy, eds., Reassessing Cold War Europe, London and New York, p. 134. 
45 
 
 
5. Theoretical framework 
 
5.1. Levels and actors of technology transfer 
 
This dissertation touches upon several issues which consider the interplay of actors of 
different levels. The main focus is put on the individual level — engineers and industrial 
scientists, broadly referred to as Soviet and Finnish specialists. As stated above, they were agents 
in transferring foreign technologies and the people who were primarily contributing to the 
modernization of Soviet industry. Another level of research focuses on institutions from both 
states. Following Douglass North, by institutions I mean “humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interaction”, which consist of informal constraints and 
formal rules.124 On the Soviet side, they included state research institutions, factories, and 
logging spots. From the Finnish side, they were mostly represented by companies and separate 
industrial enterprises. Finally, the macro level of my research is the state, represented by 
ministries and management organizations as well as inter-state establishments such as the 
Finnish-Soviet Scientific-Technical Cooperation Commission.  
Such a multi-level analysis enables me to see both large-scale and micro-level processes 
involved in both bringing Western technologies into the USSR and implementing them in the 
Soviet forestry industry. It examines how the Soviet political and industrial leadership 
envisioned the aims and content of modernization and how it imagined the role of transferring 
Western technologies in order to reach a set goal – to update an outdated system.  
Firstly, this dissertation analyzes the activities of the Soviet government (primarily 
through exploring decrees), ministries and large institutions (like Gostekhnika SSSR,a special 
committee with considerable power over science and technology development and succeeding 
institutions).125 All-union ministries and research organizations were charged with a 
responsibility for conducting modernization and defining its aims, while conforming to the 
general line drawn by the government. Among other activities, these institutions sought 
resources from inside and outside the Soviet Union. They investigated foreign industrial 
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performance and informed the Soviet engineer community about newer technologies, which 
could be transferred from other countries and used by Soviet engineers for modernizing industry. 
They also organized research and development both within research institutions and at factories. 
Focusing on this level, this dissertation studies the organization of Western-Soviet and Finnish-
Soviet scientific-technical cooperation and trade in the forestry industry, i.e. interactions on the 
levels of the state and large institutions. It explores the possibilities and limitations of these 
relations and the interests and strategies of the two sides, as well as how they shaped cooperation 
in the context of the Cold War. The role of institutions (if we look at them as independent 
entities) was crucial, but not decisive. Although institutions had strong influence in final 
decision-making outcomes, engineers and industrial scientists had voices and made decisions 
concerning innovations. 
Secondly and most important, the dissertation investigates the level of the individuals and 
groups who made modernization and technology transfer possible.126 They were engineers and 
industrial scientists who worked at enterprises and research institutions. In the terminology of 
historian Thomas Hughes, they were system builders, those who designed the development of 
the technological system (the forestry industry). They defined critical problems, explaining their 
view of the system’s drawbacks and what must be improved in its performance. They also were 
the ones were involved in transferring and implementing Western technologies. As Philip Brey 
states, “the working of machines does not provide an explanation of technological and social 
change, but is itself something that must be explained, at least in part by investigating social 
agents, their interactions, and their beliefs about technology”.127 
These levels explain the interplay between the socialist system, institutions, and personal 
agency.128 All the levels were interconnected from the top downward and from the bottom 
upwards. Institutions gave tasks to the transfer agents and the transfer agents gave responses 
after trips to foreign factories. At the same time, there was the connection between various actors 
inside each level. Both axes implied exchanges of knowledge and technologies, but sometimes 
revealed insurmountable barriers that are crucial in explaining the failures of modernization. The 
relations between institutions and individuals did not mean only the activities of individuals in 
particular buildings. Vertically, institutions and individuals interacted while defining critical 
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problems; moreover, institutions supplied individuals with know-how, techniques, etc. and 
gained their expertise.129 This exchange is obviously seen in the process of technology transfer. 
Institutions provided the transfer agents with information about target countries and industries 
they visited, while the delegates reported to institutions on what they had learned abroad. These 
exchanges could have different results, being a form of productive transfer (the transfer agent got 
a general information about the place of destination) or not bringing a positive effect (usually 
because the agents did not prepare a substantial report or the report was just archived without 
consideration). Horizontally, the communication was organized as contact between different 
institutions and engineers and scientists. Again, quite often such communication revealed strong 
and sometimes insurmountable barriers between institutions themselves and actors from different 
organizations. For instance, the analysis of continuous pulp cooking and the activities of Soviet 
inventor Leonid Zherebov in article III reveals thick barriers between organizations and even an 
unwillingness to cooperate among them. Zherebov`s project was thus restricted to a small group 
of specialists, which, in turn, encountered a range of obstacles, especially in communications and 
the sharing of knowledge across institutions. Monopolization and secrecy created an enigma 
around the invention. Zherebov`s innovative idea to cook pulp at very high temperatures was not 
supported by the research institute, even though it was intimately involved in the project together 
with engineers from the factory. As a result, this complicated the development of domestic 
innovation and motivated the state to transfer more technologies from foreign technological 
systems. To a certain extent, communication with foreign engineers and organizations was 
easier.  
My thesis examines these two-level activities and various actors in their efforts to 
modernize the Soviet forestry industry through the lens proposed by Thomas Hughes.130 
Primarily, my research employs and develops key elements of Hughes`s methodology, 
emphasizing his analysis of technology transfer and its roles in the evolution of large 
technological systems. This approach has previously been applied within science and technology 
studies to explain the development of European electrical systems, aviation development, 
recycling, and other issues.131Applying this methodology to the forestry industry enables me to 
explain the role of Western technologies in Soviet modernization through interactions of 
different factors.  
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5.2. Large technological systems and Soviet forestry 
industry 
 
This research proposes to examine the Soviet and Finnish forestry industries as two large 
technological systems, made up by different artifacts (machinery, technical details, industrial 
literature, etc.), which were developed by social actors - system builders or engineers, industrial 
scientists, businessmen and traders who worked for various organizations like industrial 
companies, research institutions and enterprises. The systems depended on the resources and 
environment in which they were embedded, as they were influenced by political factors and state 
institutions. As article I illustrates, this conception helps examine the interplay between social, 
technological, cultural, and political actors and factors.  
The chronological framework of the dissertation covers the period of 1955–1964, which 
is defined by the years of Khrushchev`s rule. As explained earlier in this introduction, since the 
modernization project was initiated by the Soviet government (although developed by local 
system builders), it was limited by the political chronology of Khrushchev’s years in power. 
During this period, Khrushchev aimed for rapid technological modernization, which was 
comprised of the following tasks: updating techniques and technological processes, launching 
new technologies, automatization, and mechanization of production. All of these shared the goal 
of increasing the production of timber as well as of existing and new types of pulp, paper, and 
other products from the forestry industry. Fulfilling these goals was essential for the 
development of the forestry system to overcome reverse salients (a set of technical and 
technological challenges), while technology transfer entered into a distinct period in its 
evolution, with its own momentum (which explains the point when the system tended to keep the 
line, although new technologies became available). According to Hughes, a technological system 
develops through several stages: invention and development, technology transfer, system growth, 
momentum. Although transfer is put into the sequence, Hughes indicates that transfer might 
occur at any time of evolution of the system and it might happen several times as well.132 
In the mid-1950s, the Soviet forestry industry system revealed itself to be in 
technological crisis. This was recognized by the leadership, which had a key role in decision-
making in the centralized system. The Soviet government, recognizing that economic 
development was hampered by reverse salient, became a formal initiator of modernization. 
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Having received the impulse for modernization, engineers and industrial scientists began to 
define actively the critical problems and to propose possible strategies for improvement by 
making expert suggestions to their institutions and, as a result, to the Ministries and Gostekhnika. 
Most of these suggestions meant technology transfer from more developed industry systems, 
based on what was allowed by Khrushchev`s political discourse. System builders aimed to 
transfer new and updated technologies which had been rapidly emerging in the United States, 
Canada, Sweden, West Germany, Finland, and other countries. Many suggestions referred to the 
Finnish forestry industry system, since Finnish-Soviet scientific and technical cooperation was 
better developed than the relations with other capitalist countries. The Finnish system was, thus, 
a donor technical system for the Soviet one, allowing the Soviets to transfer not only domestic 
Finnish technologies, but also Western technologies through Finland.133 
The specifics of the Soviet forestry industry system, like the specifics of Soviet 
modernization in general, lay in that it largely depended on the state, which often took the role of 
system builder or at least maintained serious control over innovations. As David Reynolds says, 
“state control of science was not invented by the Bolsheviks, who built on tsarist practice. Their 
structure of research institutes also drew on elitist German models. What was unique about 
Stalinist Big Science was the extent of state control and of elite isolation”.134 In later years, state 
control of innovations via state research and administrative institutions retained its power. In 
many cases, it prevented the development of initiatives on the local level, as in the case of 
continuous pulp cooking or wood wastes, discussed in articles III and IV.  
The main advantage of the selected approach is that it enables me to consider the system 
through a contextual approach of the various factors that influenced it, thus avoiding 
oversimplified explanations for the successes and failures of modernization. The dissertation 
examines the forestry industry as a large technological system influenced by economic 
(financial), social, political and cultural factors. Based on selected technologies, it explores how 
economic interests, political calculations, and cultural factors resulting from the interactions of 
the systems were incorporated into various cultural and political contexts, how knowledge 
enhanced or limited the transfer, and what possibilities and restrictions were created. While 
considering separate technologies (continuous pulp cooking, recycling of wood wastes and one 
year plants, forest road construction, paper making technologies, among others), this research 
examines the ways these technologies were brought to enterprises, how specialists implemented 
                                                     
133 See more on technological development of Finnish forestry industry in Jensen-Eriksen, N. (2007). Läpimurto. 
Metsäteollisuus kasvun, integration ja kylmän sodan Euroopassa 1950–1973. Jyväskylä; Nordberg, T. (1998). 
Yhtyneet paperitehtaat osakeyhtiö 1952–1969. Hämeenlinna; Heikkinen, S. Op. cit. 
134 Reynolds, D. (2010). Science, Technology and the Cold War. In M. Leffler and O.A. Westard, eds., The 
Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. 3. Cambridge, p. 381. 
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them, and what factors played a role the in success or failure of their introduction. The social 
factors are primarily the specialists, their communities and networks, the institutions they 
worked in, as well as their technical expertise and practices. The dominant technical factor is the 
equipment and technical details needed for launching technologies. Another factor is the 
resources involved in production, which include both finances and the raw materials needed for 
every technology to function. Politics, or the role of the state and the ministries responsible for 
developing industry, is an additional factor. Studying the interplay of these actors and factors 
illustrates how specialists worked with techniques and technologies, how they coped with a lack 
in expertise, technical parts, or equipment, what areas were supplied with resources and funding, 
how Finnish specialists, techniques and raw materials helped launch technologies, and whether it 
was successful or not. This enables me to explain how, in the same context and with similar 
resources, some technologies (like bleaching of pulp) were introduced while others (like using of 
wood wastes and continuous cooking) failed to be implemented.  
The dissertation examines how system builders experienced the system as well as the 
ways in which they tried to implement foreign technologies. Again, in most cases, the reason for 
the failure in implanting foreign technologies was the lack of communication between 
institutions and among individuals and inside the institutions as well as the scarcity of Soviet 
technological resources and poor infrastructure. 
At the same time, this approach enables me to illustrate other meanings of transfers. 
Thus, while traveling abroad to investigate practices and technologies in a different system, 
system builders acquired a status of transfer agents. While fulfilling their tasks, the agents 
encountered non-technological aspects, which influenced them, often implicitly. Any 
technological system evolves in a certain political, social and cultural context. Technology 
transfer is always accompanied by non-technological influences. The technological components 
of a large technological system, thus, cannot be separated from the social and cultural context in 
which it is embedded, especially when we speak of transfer through the Iron Curtain. In the age 
of ideological competition with the West, transfer agents, the thin top layer of experts in an 
industry, were exposed to a vision of the Western world that competed with the official Soviet 
version, and specialists brought these ideas back to their colleagues and workplaces. They 
defined technical reverse salients of the forestry system and travelled abroad to learn Western 
technologies in order to overcome technical problems at home. After returning, they saw other 
drawbacks of the system, not only technical reverse salients, but also deficiencies of 
management and casual problems of production. Their trips stimulated them to reevaluate their 
own experience and compare the Soviet and Finnish systems in terms not only of technological 
progress, but also of working conditions and cultural development. In Khrushchev`s time, it was 
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not unusual to discuss wages and labor conditions, and already “in the first year after Stalin`s 
death several prominent Soviet writers raised new themes in their work. They spoke of sincerity, 
bureaucratic corruption, and the tensions between generations”.135This dissertation research 
shows that discussions were possible among other layers of the society – among specialists who 
worked in the industrial sector.  
                                                     
135 Suny, R. (1998). The Soviet Experiment. New York, Oxford, p. 405. 
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6. Sources and methodology 
 
6.1. General remarks 
 
This thesis is based on significant collections of primary and secondary sources. I define 
my sources as those produced by actors of local, intermediate, and macro levels. These are 
archival collections which include a large variety of reporting materials, correspondence, 
personal papers and notes; scientific works published in professional journals, volumes and other 
periodicals, and publications in newspapers; as well as interviews given by former Soviet and 
Finnish engineers.  
The main feature shared by archival and periodical materials lays in their fragmentary 
nature and dispersion in different archival funds, collections and printed sources. Thus, in order 
to trace the moving of technologies and the people who transferred them, roughly speaking, from 
point A to B (for instance, from a Finnish enterprise to a Soviet one through several institutions), 
I use sources coming from central and local organizations and actors. This entails looking for 
materials in a number of archives from two sides and collecting various pieces in order to 
reconstruct the whole picture. The number of archival sources for this work is, therefore, large, 
although not always enough to cover some aspects in full. In this reconstruction of transfers, 
some specific questions are still missing. For instance, in considering modernization and transfer 
of technology to bleach pulp, I have a lot of evidence showing that foreign equipment was 
transferred to a Soviet enterprise while the origin of these mechanisms is not always clear. As a 
result, I have two reconstructed cases of transfer (namely, continuous pulp cooking and the use 
of wood wastes in the forestry industry), which present the basis of my dissertation. In addition, I 
gather other significant evidence, though not fully reconstructed stories, which contribute to a 
general picture of how the Soviets studied, transferred and implemented Finnish technologies.  
At the same time, the nature of the materials enables me to examine documents produced 
by social, economic and political actors. My sources are different documents made by scientific, 
research, political, economic and other institutions, all of which participated in technology 
transfer and the modernization of the Soviet forestry industry. These materials, taken from all the 
levels described, present a complicated picture of communication between establishments of 
different levels within Soviet industry and between Soviet institutions and Finnish organizations. 
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This enables me to rebuild interactions of transfer agents within the Soviet Union as well as 
between the USSR and Finland in terms of inter-state, institutional, and personal contacts. 
This chapter describes several collections of sources as well as the methodological 
aspects of working with these materials.  
 
6.2. Enactment documents 
 
The source base for this dissertation is constituted of unpublished, published, and oral 
materials. The largest part of sources is documents located in various archive collections from 
the Soviet and Finnish sides. Among them are decrees and notes issued by different Soviet 
ministries and institutions responsible for the development of science and technology. These are 
decrees produced by central bodies and local managing institutions dealing with the sphere for 
which they were responsible. I treat all management institutions as embodiments of the Soviet 
state: issuing decrees in their field, they acted within the framework of instructions and discourse 
set by the center – in particular, directives of the party and separate leaders like Nikita 
Khrushchev. Usually, such documents made reference to a general task given by the center, for 
example the need to increase production, spur automation of technological procedures, or study 
the best foreign experience. Most of the decrees I found are stored in the State Archive of the 
Russian Federation (GARF) and the Russian State Archive of Economy (RGAE), both located in 
Moscow.136 As a rule, these documents consist of two parts: an introduction, which might take 
up to several pages, and a list of tasks and aims to be fulfilled. The introduction usually contains 
a detailed description of problems in the development of the industry, probably based on expert 
conclusions prepared by responsible institutions. In some cases, these explanations summarize 
previous developments and references to historical processes. Although such introductions do 
not provide any reference to the sources of their data, they help examine what critical problems 
were put forth by the state, which actually played an important role in modernization in both 
stimulating and controlling improvements. In the second part, these documents list concrete tasks 
and, thus, reveal the intentions and aims of the state.  
 
                                                     
136 GARF, funds 409 (State Committee on Science and Technology of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic), 408 (State Committee on Coordination of Research of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union); 
RGAE, funds 7637 (Ministry of Forestry Industry of the USSR), 8513 (Ministry of Paper and Woodworking 
Industry of the USSR), 9480 (State Committee on Science and Technology of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet 
Union). 
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6.3. Correspondence 
 
Another kind of document is correspondence between Soviet institutions of the all-Union 
level, usually between the State Committee of New Techniques (Gostekhnika)137 and various 
ministries, institutions of the republican level (like Gostekhnika of the Russian Republic), 
research institutions, as well as separate enterprises and, more rarely, individuals. These 
bureaucratic documents constitute one of the basic source collections for this dissertation as they 
reveal the nature of modernization and technology transfer through inter-institutional 
communication. In this correspondence, I found a variety of problems encountered by different 
institutions. In general, personal letter exchange between heads of research institutions, officials 
of ministries, ministerial branches, chiefs and leading engineers of enterprises illustrate a 
complicated network full of connections, inter-dependencies, and obstacles. Their letters reveal 
the barriers between research establishments and industrial enterprises. Both hardly assisted each 
other in matters such as sharing literature, expertise, cooperation on some projects, etc. In 
addition, I use some correspondence between Finnish, Swedish and other foreign organizations 
primarily with Gostekhnika/GKNT, which was in charge of seeking out Western technology. 
These data are scarce and quite fragmentary, although they provide some details on 
communication between East and West. Among these indications is correspondence on 
adaptation of foreign techniques, invitations to visit Soviet enterprises, greetings and short 
reflections of praise after visits, as well as advertisements sent to Soviet enterprises (but finally 
redirected to Gostekhnika/GKNT) by Western companies.138 
I also build my analysis on some correspondence between Finnish actors involved in 
trade with the Soviet Union. These are three letters written by Finnish producers to officials 
providing their judgments and expectations from cooperation.139 In particular, they illustrate the 
issues Finnish companies were concerned with such as prices, the diversity of goods, and the 
reliability of the Soviet Union, among others.  
 
                                                     
137 As mentioned above, in 1955 the State Committee on New Techniques of the Council of Ministers of the USSR 
(Gostekhnika SSSR) was created as an organ to coordinate the development of science and technology and 
implement best Soviet and Western technologies. In 1957 it was demolished and the State Committee on Science 
and Technology (GKNT) was organized with very similar functions. In 1961 it was succeeded by quite similar State 
Committee on Coordination of Research. These establishments were created on the all-Union level and were 
duplicated in every republic within the USSR. 
138 GARF, fund 408; RGAE, fund 9480. 
139 Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto, Signum 58. Ulkomaankauppa ja ulkomaankauppapolitiikka. 58 B1, Neuvostoliitto. 
Kotelo 112. 
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6.4. Reports 
 
All the actors examined in the dissertation were involved in producing the most valuable 
and largest group of documents. First, these are current reports on the yearly development of 
science and technology or separate fields prepared by Gostekhnika/GKNT and later similar 
institutions. Since these organizations were responsible for the development of science and 
technology in general, their specialists prepared reports on technologies concerning different 
branches of the forestry industry. For example, these include reports made after inspections from 
Gostekhnika/GKNT visited research institutions and separate enterprises where they examined 
how new technologies were developed or how Western technologies had been adopted. These 
reports provide a valuable view on the process of innovation in the Soviet forestry industry, the 
preferences expressed by the Soviet state in its efforts at modernization, as well as the difficulties 
and successes of those efforts.  
A number of reports on the general conditions of some branches within the industry were 
prepared by Soviet ministries and organizations of the highest level.140If reports by 
Gostekhnika/GKNT seem to be more comprehensive in terms of providing both positive and 
negative results of experiments, ministerial reports are full of criticism and tasks to fulfill. They 
rarely analyzed separate technologies in detail, but mostly emphasized general negative trends of 
the industry. In many cases, both kinds of reports referred to Western experience as an example 
of possible development. The aim of ministerial reports was to outline the tasks and points for 
improvement, and these aims were usually listed in the reports. In this respect, however, it is 
sometimes difficult to find any data about whether these aims were achieved or not. Both kinds 
of reports are held not as one collection but disseminated in different funds mostly located in 
GARF and RGAE. As a result, I have reports covering both the all-Union level and separate 
republics and prepared in different years, but not illuminating the whole period. Still, these 
materials provide an opportunity to learn about the development of the industry and related fields 
as well as the policy of ministries. 
Documentation of the Central Research Institute on Paper and Pulp (TsNIIB) located in 
the Russian State Archive of Scientific-Technical Documentation in Saint-Petersburg is also 
crucial for reconstructing the process of innovation.141 It contains reports of industrial scientists 
responsible for developing various technologies, including continuous pulp cooking, as well as 
minutes of discussions on technologies. This institution had close connections with a nearby pulp 
and paper plant in Svetogorsk, often addressed in this dissertation. The materials of the institute 
                                                     
140 GARF, fund A-510 (Chief Administration of Forestry and Forest Protection); RGAE, funds 7637, 8513. 
141 RGANTD (Saint-Petersburg), fund 303 (the Central Institute of Paper and Pulp). 
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illustrate the concrete work done on innovations and aspects of cooperation and tensions between 
engineers and scientists.  
Reports and correspondence materials of the Soviet-Finnish Chamber of Trade stored in 
the National Archive of Finland (Suomen Kansallisarkisto) illustrate the organization of Soviet 
industrial exhibitions in Finland and Finnish exhibiting activities in the Soviet Union.142 Letters 
by officials of the Chamber, reports on exhibitions prepared and held, and notes made by 
organizers and visitors (ranging from forestry engineers to ordinary members of the public) deal 
with different aspects of exhibition activities. In addition to displaying some equipment and 
materials for a certain period, these activities were accompanied by lectures by specialists, 
negotiations between traders and producers, informal communication, and more. The materials 
on the exhibitions, thus, enable me to examine different specific modes of cooperation as well as 
interactions between different actors involved in these activities.  
Reports by specialists who visited Finland and some other countries (Sweden, West 
Germany, and Canada) during their business trips are another cornerstone of my thesis. The 
largest part of these reports is located in the archive of Gostekhnika/GKNT and collections of 
ministerial documents or organizations responsible for learning and the implementation of 
foreign technologies in organizations of smaller scale. The accumulation of the reports in several 
managing institutions was the result of strict centralization. As a rule, specialists were to submit 
the reports within one month after coming back to their enterprises or research institutions, 
which forwarded these documents to managing organizations. While most of these documents 
were archived, usually not revised carefully by officials, a portion of the reports was checked 
thoroughly and published in professional journals and special volumes of reports.143 All these 
reports had a relatively similar structure. First, they listed all the places the delegates visited, 
explained the need to visit Finland by describing the better performance of Finnish enterprises, 
and devoted about forty pages to descriptions of their visit sites. Many reports dealt not only with 
the assigned topic of travel, but encompassed other professional matters observed by the 
delegates, with particular emphasis on detailed descriptions of mechanisms and procedures like 
barking, the work of chipping machines, and a general view of factories. In the conclusion, the 
delegates gave recommendations for more detailed examination of certain topics, considered 
new topics, planned to implement learned technologies, and included long lists of machines and 
                                                     
142 Suomen Kansallisarkisto. Suomalais-venäläinen kauppakamarin arkisto. Hs:5–7. 
143RGANTD (Samara), funds R-160 (the Central Research Institute on Mechanical Wood Processing), R-216 (the 
All-Union Planning Institute “Soiuzgiproles”), R-613 (Moscow`s Branch of the Central Research Institute of Paper); 
Lesnaia promyshlennost`, Informatsionny biulleten` annotatsiy otchetov sovetskikh uchenykh o zarubezhnykh 
komandirovkakh; Zarubezhnaia tekhnika: Biulleten`. Po materialam otchetov o zarubezhnykh komandirovkakh, and 
others. 
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technical items to purchase. In many cases, these reports became sources of information for other 
delegates who referred to previous trips and recommendations to learn about new topics. 
To a large extent, these reports were designed as sources of technical information, aiming 
to inform readers about the industrial sites and institutions the delegates visited and to detail the 
“useful” technologies they observed. In this sense, these reports provide valuable data on 
technologies used in Khrushchev’s modernization project. At the same time, in reading these 
reports, we encounter descriptions that go beyond technical information, such as questions about 
working culture, the conditions of workers, and life in the “Western world.” This indicates 
exposure to non-technical influences that differed from Soviet practices and challenged 
delegates` view of Soviet conditions. Such comments, however, do not present the whole 
picture: they were few in number, and the information put into them was measured since the 
authors did not want to attract the suspicions of the authorities.  
I could not find any reports or other reflections of Finnish specialists on their 
communication with arriving Soviet delegates, and it is likely that they were not prepared, as one 
of my interviewers – a representative of a Finnish company – explained.144 However, in the 
Finnish Business Archive (Elinkeinoelämän Keskusarkisto, ELKA) I found seven reports made 
by Finnish engineers of the company Ahlström after their visits to foreign enterprises, in 
particular to the USA, Canada, and Sweden.145 These are relatively detailed descriptions of 
visits, technologies, and communication with foreign specialists. Although it is complicated to 
follow the movement of the same technologies from North American to Finnish and then to 
Soviet enterprises, these documents help reconstruct a general picture of multiple transfers. To a 
large extent, close Finnish-Soviet scientific-technical contacts provided the Soviets with an 
opportunity to learn about not only Finnish technologies, but technologies of other capitalist 
countries. In Soviet archival materials, in particular in some observations of specialists who 
travelled to Finnish enterprises, I saw some indications that Finns could help break the 
technological Iron Curtain created by CoCom restrictions and the Cold War.  
In addition to these reports, ELKA`s collections contain reports on Finnish trips, 
probably made within the program of scientific-technical cooperation and trade, to Soviet 
enterprises,.146 In most cases, these trips aimed not only to investigate the level of Soviet 
forestry, but to a large extent to set contacts with local producers and administrators in order to 
open new prospects for trade and other forms of cooperation. They covered a wide geography, 
                                                     
144 Interview with Kari Ketola, taken 27.11.2013 in Helsinki. 
145 ELKA, Ahlström A. OY, Varkauden tehtaat. Insinööri Hans Schneckin kokoamat historia-ainestot, 1952–1966. 
Matkakertomukset.  
146 ELKA, Suomen puunjalostusteollisuuden keskusliitto. Neuvostoliiton kauppa. Kansiot 1765–1767; 
Metsäteollisuus ry, kansainvälinen yhteistyö, Suomi-Neuvostoliitto. Kansio 1446. 
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described key features and important questions of the enterprises visited, and discussed various 
aspects of Finnish-Soviet trade and scientific-technical cooperation. For instance, they related, 
among other things, how Soviet engineers dealt with Finnish equipment in Soviet enterprises and 
what benefits might be drawn from contacts with the USSR. These reports illustrate the 
intentions of local actors from the Finnish side as well as the nature of Finnish-Soviet 
interactions. Also, comparing Soviet and Finnish reports helps reconstruct different visions of 
“the other” and other technologies in the Cold War. Although the descriptions in both sets of 
reports are similar in terms of structure, these documents reveal different aims and expectations.       
 
6.5. Materials of the Svetogorsk pulp and paper plant 
 
The last group of materials is presented by local documents of the Svetogorsky pulp and 
paper plant (former Enso) located in the Leningrad Regional State Archive in Vyborg 
(LOGAV).147The dissertation is mainly based on the example of this plant for a number of 
reasons. First, it was among the largest producers of pulp and paper in the Soviet Union. Second, 
in the 1950s and 1960s, this former Finnish plant was representative of Soviet enterprise in 
facing typical problems of management, communication, supplies of techniques and raw 
materials, work culture, etc. Third, it was a playground for developing the technique of 
continuous pulp and paper cooking, which is the focus of article III. The fund of this enterprise 
contains reports of receiving new techniques, deliveries, experiments on separate technologies 
and notes on fulfilling plans made by engineers. In particular, reports on implementing such 
technologies as continuous pulp cooking, bleaching pulp, wood supplies and other issues present 
the character of modernization in one enterprise. The fund`s collection is manifold, although 
some materials shown in inventories are missing. Though they may have been lost or destroyed, 
they were probably moved to Moscow`s archives as the result of centralization.  
In addition, the picture of modernization and the use of foreign experience on the local 
level is illustrated by another sort of materials, namely the collection of minutes of discussions in 
Svetogorsk`s local party organization. These discussions were arranged frequently and involved 
employees who were party members or candidates. The Central Archive of historical-political 
documents in Saint-Petersburg (TsGAIPD) holds detailed minutes of this organization’s open 
and closed meetings.148 They are quite a specific source brimming with party vocabulary, which, 
however, provides some discussions on basic technological problems in the plant. Being 
                                                     
147 LOGAV, fund R-180 (Svetogorsky Pulp and Paper Plant). 
148 TsGAIPD, fund O-1542 (Party organization of production enterprise Svetogorsk).  
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primarily involved in industrial production and living in an industrial town, the local party 
members discussed professional issues along with everyday and cultural topics. As a rule, these 
minutes were revised carefully, but they discussed only negative moments and were full of 
criticism. While in many cases materials of the plant`s engineers present a positive picture of 
changes and the fulfillment of annual and monthly plans, minutes of party discussions mostly 
talk about negative aspects of the plant’s activities. The most ‘popular’ strategy was blaming 
managers of separate factories and departments of the plant for various mistakes and 
shortcomings. Actually, each technical problem, like the discrepancy in outcomes compared to 
targets set by the annual plans, was presented as a result of insufficient organization and an 
irresponsible attitude towards the matter. This criticism was said to stimulate the activities of the 
plant`s workers. At the same time, unlike the official reports of the plant, the minutes of party 
discussions were not exposed to a wider audience and allowed more criticism. These materials 
are valuable in terms of showing “live discussions” of workers, particularly in comparison with 
other sources to produce a critical view of the plant’s modernization.  
The collection of local sources is complemented by materials of a newspaper published in 
Svetogorsk and titled “Svetogorski rabochii” (“Stakhanovets” until 1956).149 This periodical was 
published twice a week and contained articles by the party organization and the plant. The 
newspaper was printed with a circulation of a thousand copies and was distributed among the 
plant’s workers as well as the nearby town’s other inhabitants. While there were many 
publications on political news, some engineers and workers published short articles on current 
problems of the plant, local events, plans, and announcements. In this respect, this category of 
materials is a valuable source for my thesis as they provide the views of those who were 
involved in the activities of the plant in the 1950s-1960s. However, both the newspaper articles 
and minutes of meetings of the party organization are quite ideological: both contain a lot of 
references to speeches and presentations given by party leaders and slogans. In some instances, 
they served as propaganda materials to appeal to the need for modernization and, as a 
consequence, they might misrepresent the reservations or criticism of some individuals. In 
addition, as in many other Soviet sources, a large number of speeches in the minutes and 
newspaper articles were anonymous. In most cases it is extremely difficult to identify the 
authors.  
 
 
                                                     
149 Svetogorski rabochii, 1953–1964.  
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6.6. Statistical data 
 
     Specific materials are presented by statistics, in particular in the volumes on foreign 
trade issued yearly by the publishing organization Vneshtorgizdat.150These volumes contain 
numbers on the import and export of different goods from and to Finland and other countries. 
These figures do not provide detailed information on specific items, but discuss categories like 
pulp making equipment, etc. In this sense, I use these data to illustrate a general picture of 
transfers from Finland to the Soviet Union. Other statistical data I encountered in different Soviet 
archival sources is quite fragmentary and difficult to check for reliability. In fact, unreliability 
and the common falsification of Soviet statistical materials is the crucial reason for why I do not 
refer much to statistics.151 Other statistical data is given in the draft and year treaties as well as in 
the minutes of negotiations between the Soviet foreign trade organization and Finnish companies 
archived in the Finnish Archive of Foreign Affairs (Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto). I use these 
sources to trace the imports of some specific techniques and technical parts as well as the general 
dynamics of technological trade between the countries.152 
 
6.7. Interviews 
 
 Finally, my thesis is based on several interviews of former Finnish and Soviet 
specialists who took part in the modernization of Soviet forestry industry. First, I use five 
interviews by engineers of Finnish companies Enso-Gutzeit and Rauma-Repola.153 Because my 
research is several decades far away from the period in focus, the interviews deal with the 
1970s–1990s. The interviews were organized as a free conversation with some basic questions. 
They concerned professional experience, ways of cooperating with Soviet specialists, issues 
related to the organization of scientific-technical cooperation and trade as well as professional 
communication. No less important are conclusions and opinions expressed in the interviews on 
Soviet modernization, its failures, successes and peculiarities. These materials enable me to 
specify some aspects not presented in other materials and to compare the archival sources with 
                                                     
150 Vneshniaia torgovliia SSSR, M., 1957-1964.   
151 For example, as historian of Stalinism Yves Cohen shows, Stalin`s officials often distorted statistics intentionally 
or occasionally. Cohen, Y. Op. cit., p. 44.  Joseph Berliner mentions this in the relation of 1950s and 1960s. See 
Berliner, J. Op. cit. 
152 Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto, Signum 58. Ulkomaankauppa ja ulkomaankauppapolitiikka. 58 B1, Neuvostoliitto. 
Kotelot 116-19, 126, 129. 
153 Taken in November–December, 2012 and between August and December, 2013. Kari Ketola, three interviews 
taken in August and November, 2013; Ilkka Kallio, November, 2012; Raimo Mäkelä, December, 2012; Voitto 
Pölkki, December, 2012; anonymous interview, November, 2012.   
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the experience of engineers themselves. I also conducted one interview with a former Soviet 
engineer whose professional activities were not directly connected with the subject of my thesis, 
but who was engaged in a later project “Ladenso,” a mutual Finnish-Soviet enterprise in Soviet 
Karelia.154 The questions in this interview were similar to the others and concerned the 
technological side of cooperation (such as comparison of techniques in Finland and the Soviet 
Union, technology transfer, effects of modernization), and cultural aspects (language problems, 
ways of informal communication), among others.  
In general, all the key materials outlined in this chapter present the basis for my research. 
Together, they help reconstruct technology transfer and its effects for Soviet modernization in 
the forestry industry. Except for the interviews, these are mostly mass sources which provide a 
solid grounding for the project, though they are not complete in every aspect.  
                                                     
154 Interview with Yuri Kuznetsov, February, 2013.  
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7. Results 
The main question of this dissertation is the role of Western, and in particular, Finnish 
technology, in the Soviet modernization of the forestry industry in 1955–1964. This question 
concerns three sets of questions related to Soviet modernization and the forestry industry, Soviet 
technology transfer and innovations as outlined in chapter 2. The results for each part are 
considered in separate sub-chapters. 
 
7.1. Soviet modernization in the forestry industry 
 
This thesis examines the use of forest resources in the Soviet Union as well as industrial 
operations for making pulp and pulp-based products. It emphasizes state politics and the 
activities of engineers and industrial scientists as well as their visions of technological 
modernization. 
 
7.1.1. Development of the forestry industry in the 1950s and 1960s 
 
This research approaches the Soviet forestry industry as a large technological system with 
a number of deficiencies that had already been officially recognized several times during the 
Khrushchev era. The critical problems of the system derived from backward technologies in 
wood harvesting, pulp and pulp-based products making. Thus, as article IV shows, while the 
volume of cuts was high, the amount of waste left in the forests was enormous and led to a rapid 
devastation of forest resources. Also, as articles I and III show, the quality of pulp and other 
products was often low and the Soviet forestry industry lagged behind other countries in making 
pulp, paper, machinery and other goods. Soviet leaders and engineers believed that backward 
technologies, which prevented the required development, explained this lag. The chain “raw 
materials-production/innovation-goods” was not working smoothly. In different stages, 
producers faced difficulties such as the inadequate and poorly organized supply of raw materials 
and techniques, the absence of proper technology and trained engineers and workers. Soviet 
specialists understood it well. All the articles support the argument that the Soviet industry was 
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facing shortages, and they illustrate that this was a crucial feature for the development of the 
forestry industry in the 1950s and 1960s.155 
 
7.1.2. Modernization of the forestry industry as seen by Soviet specialists 
 
Modernization involved many activities of engineers working in various branches and 
with various technologies. Articles I, III and IV show that when modernization was declared, 
Soviet engineers, encouraged by the leadership, defined critical problems, which should have 
increased the quality of products. In general, Soviet engineers showed that they were able to 
define the critical problems well and see what was required for successful development, while 
they often could not solve these problems using only internal resources. Their suggestions were 
related to a large number of fields, ranging from the reduction of cuts in the forests to making 
viscose pulp. In these suggestions, as article IV puts it, we see the intention to reduce wasteful 
cuts and introduce the more rational use of resources. This intention served economic purposes: 
using resources rationally, improving technology and techniques would save resources for future 
industrial production. Nonetheless, there was a group of scientists who thought about cutting less 
in order to save the forests for the future. 
All the articles argue that, as in previous and later periods, both leaders and engineers 
relied on the transfer of Western experience and technologies in order to modernize the Soviet 
forestry industry. Borrowed technologies were to fill the gaps in the Soviet forestry technological 
system in order to provide a quicker modernization of technological processes and equipment, 
but in practice modernization saw different outcomes. While some technologies were 
successfully implemented, others failed or succeeded only partially. The Soviet institutions did 
not recognize the problems of resource shortages as something to be solved through innovation. 
As a result, Soviet innovations remained dependent on Western technologies.  
 
 
7.2. East-West cooperation and technology transfer 
 
This thesis provides a number of examples of the permeability of the Iron Curtain, 
illustrating different channels of communication between Soviet and Western engineers and 
                                                     
155 Kornai, J. (1980). Economics of Shortage. Amsterdam; Berliner, J. Op. cit; Schattenberg, S. Op. cit.; Osokina, E. 
(2001). Our Daily Bread. Armonk, New York and London, among others. 
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industrial scientists. The two chosen channels – trade and industrial exhibitions of Finnish 
companies in the USSR and visits by Soviet specialists to Finnish enterprises—analyzed in this 
dissertation in detail, demonstrate encounters between actors from two technological systems. 
Analysis of these encounters leads to two conclusions.  
 
7.2.1. Importance of encounters on the micro level 
 
Articles I and II contribute to a discussion of Soviet-Finnish trade and Cold War 
interactions between the socialist and capitalist blocs. As article I argues, the Soviet state was 
the main instigator for technology transfer, aiming to use the resources of advanced 
technological systems in Soviet modernization. In doing so, the Khrushchev leadership signed 
agreements on trade and scientific-technical cooperation with a number of capitalist countries, 
which intensified communication through exhibitions and visits of specialists. Article I shows 
that visits of Soviet engineers and industrial scientists to foreign enterprises were an important 
means of communication and learning more about another technological system. As article II 
states, exhibitions entailed various activities, such as presentations, lectures, intensive 
advertising, and personal meetings of Finnish and Soviet traders, managers and specialists. They 
contributed to an increase in knowledge about what was happening behind the Iron Curtain and 
opened up a channel for technology transfer to Soviet industry. Through these encounters, 
Finnish traders could illustrate the possibilities of the Finnish forestry system and goods that 
might be delivered to the USSR. They advertised and promoted production as they established 
economic ties with potential consumers.  Soviet specialists and officials could choose 
technologies to transfer and see the material product with their own eyes before buying it. They 
made recommendations on the purchase and implementation of Finnish experience in domestic 
production.  
Article II shows that encounters at exhibitions were not penetrated by ideology, but 
rather focused on business activities and a way of demonstrating the possibilities of Finnish 
imports to Soviet managers and specialists. For Finnish traders, it was also a way of competing 
for Soviet consumers. For Soviet visitors, it was a channel to examine Finnish production and 
decide what techniques and technologies could be transferred.  
 
7.2.2. Technology transfer and non-technological impacts 
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Still, even without ideological implications, encounters entailed non-technological 
impacts. Article I discusses travels of Soviet engineers and industrial scientists to Finland to 
bring advanced technological know-how. The Soviet leadership did not intend Soviet specialists 
to bring anything except the technologies necessary for modernization. However, given that any 
technological system evolves in a certain political, social and cultural context, technology 
transfer is always accompanied by non-technological influences. Due to organizational aspects 
of Soviet travels to Finland, as examined in article I, transfer agents acquired a new role as 
social and cultural transfer agents. Thus, due to general impressions, the need to visit as many 
enterprises as possible, the lack of finances, and the excessive centralization of communication 
between Western and Soviet specialists, there was an unexpected transfer by forestry industry 
specialists. The technological components of a large technological system, thus, cannot be 
separated from the social and cultural context in which they are embedded, especially when we 
speak of transfer through the Iron Curtain. Trips stimulated Soviet transfer agents to reevaluate 
their own experience and compare the Soviet and Finnish systems in terms not only of 
technological progress, but also of working conditions and cultural development. While Soviet 
transfer agents were aware of the better technological performance of Finnish forestry industry, 
their trips abroad deepened their impressions and stimulated further debates from the perspective 
of positive capitalist experience. Specialists discussed wages, labor culture, and conditions in 
Finland at meetings which were supposed to discuss technologies and foreign industry. The 
thesis, thus, contributes to debates about Khrushchev`s “thaw” as it played out in engineering 
and scientific communities.  This period allowed more space for personal opinions, and these 
opinions were shaped by the foreign experience of delegates. As article I shows, such debates 
took place among engineers who worked in the forestry industry.  
 
7.3. Soviet innovations and implementation of Western 
technologies 
 
Visits by Soviet specialists to Finland and encounters between Finnish and Soviet actors 
at trade and industrial exhibitions allowed the transfer of Finnish and Western technologies to 
the Soviet forestry industry. This dissertation accepts that transfer, as a complete procedure, 
means a two-stage process – transportation and implementation of technologies. The second 
phase was the most fraught and did not automatically lead to the better performance of the Soviet 
forestry industry system. In most cases, the efforts to develop a competitive industry failed and 
made the Soviet system dependent on the foreign system. In other words, the transfer of the 
66 
 
1950s and 1960s meant bringing technologies from the donor (Finnish) to the recipient (Soviet) 
system and afterwards this schema remained as such. Articles III and IV contribute to the 
discussion of Soviet innovation and the role in it of technology transfer. The following results 
explain the reasons for this as they discuss Soviet implementation of Western technologies.  
 
7.3.1.  Deficiencies of the Soviet forestry system and their impacts on innovations 
 
Articles III and IV illustrate that the problem of turning inventions into innovations as 
well as further developing technologies that had been transferred layin the deficiencies of the 
technological system as a whole. The system resembled an organism made up of various 
components. The articles illustrate that the technological system did not change as a whole; it 
continued to suffer from shortages of techniques, technical details and knowledge in the 
Khrushchev period. Bringing new technologies did not imply a radical shift in production and 
required a lot of time and resources. The problem of implementation of imported technologies 
could only be solved by solving the problems of the system itself, such as the supply and training 
of workers. The main reason for failures in implementation was the Soviet mindset that assumed 
technology could be introduced into the system quickly. On the contrary, innovation required 
large amounts of time and investment. For these reasons, the Soviets were interested in 
purchasing whole enterprises and mechanisms, although it was not always possible in practice. 
Successful transfers were those brought as a whole, as article III illustrates. And as article IV 
shows, due to these reasons, after purchasing some mechanisms like debarking machines or 
chippers, Soviet engineers put a lot of effort into repairing them. In some cases, these new 
techniques remained dependent on foreign repair parts and caused either sophisticated inventions 
or delays in production. 
With varying successes, the transfer of foreign technologies helped fill the gaps in the 
technological system. As article III shows, Kamyr apparatuses purchased from abroad allowed 
manufacturing pulp continuously. Article IV illustrates that even though there was 
communication with Finnish engineers about experimenting with using alternative resources in 
pulp making and even though technical equipment was purchased, the deficiencies of the Soviet 
technological system made successful implementation impossible. 
 
7.3.2. Barriers between institutions and Soviet innovation 
 
67 
 
Article III shows institutional and personal barriers that hindered the implementation of 
imported technologies. The socialist regime saw some technologies of the forestry industry as 
strategically important. As a result, the state prevented the diffusion of information even within 
the industry. In many cases, scientists and engineers worked in isolation and had no access to 
literature, technical details and other artifacts (in Hughes`s terms) available at other Soviet 
factories and research institutions. As Joseph Berliner said in 1973, “a fundamental feature of 
modern science and technology is its international character”156 and it was indeed a crucial 
feature of the post-war scientific and technological development. Within the Soviet forestry 
industry, dysfunctional contacts among various actors hindered development because of 
competition between institutions, the need for each to fulfill the plan, and simple technical 
inability to cooperate. Article IV shows that conflicts between timber mills and pulp makers hid 
a technical problem. Neither was capable of either preparing chips or transporting them while 
both accused the other of an indifferent attitude towards the use of wood wastes. There were 
often barriers between suppliers of raw materials or timber mills, supplies of techniques and 
technical details, research institutions, and producers of pulp, paper, cardboard and other 
products. This led to interruptions in production and the development of innovations.  
Article III examines continuous pulp cooking dating back to the 1940s. During the Stalin 
era, state support sustained the project. After Khrushchev`s liberalizing reforms, the conflict 
between participating institutions led to the end of the project. These institutional barriers 
between research and industry were also a product of excessive centralization of industry, the 
key feature of the Soviet regime. In the forestry industry, it prevented the making of a collective 
invention, in the terminology of Robert Allen, which requires a free flow of information about 
new techniques and technologies among firms.157The strategic importance of bleaching pulp, 
making high-quality cord pulp and other materials, prevented a larger discussion of reverse 
salients. After liberalization and the reorganization of the invention system, the degree of secrecy 
decreased and the system stopped working on some technologies and, rather, using ready-made 
innovations transferred from the West.  
 
7.3.3. Partiality of transfers and the problem of modernizing the whole technological 
system 
 
Articles I, III and IV prove that Soviet specialists paid much attention to details and 
aimed to transfer separate technologies. Often, Soviet modernization efforts in the forestry 
                                                     
156 Berliner, J. Op. cit., p. 212. 
157 Allen, R. (1983). Collective Invention. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,  4(1), pp. 1–24. 
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industry were pursued on a small scale, with no real attempt modernizing the whole system as 
was indeed required. As a result, Soviet specialists were not able to change the infrastructure or 
the technological system. To illustrate this conclusion, article IV argues that when a critical 
problem was revealed in making better and cheaper wood, this required a change in the wood 
supply system. Most successful were those innovations which were brought as a whole such as 
the Kamyr apparatus (examined in article III) but not those which were transferred partially, 
such as the technologies and techniques for using alternative resources examined in article IV. 
Transferring details implied the need to improve the whole technological system, i.e. 
infrastructure and the system of supply, but this need was not articulated in Khrushchev’s time. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
Russia is a paradigmatic example of a country continuously trying to modernize. Almost 
every political period saw an attempt to modernize industry and take the lead in technology and 
production. Modernization was always accompanied by comparisons with the West, most vividly 
in the Soviet epoch.158 But, as Kristine Bruland and Dave Mowery state, it was “a noncapitalist 
catch up failure”.159It is hard to measure success and failure, but an array of examples of failed 
technologies, low quality of production, and poor general performance of the forestry industry 
are convincing proof.  
This dissertation has conceptualized several historical and methodological aspects of 
Soviet technological modernization in the forestry industry in a dialogue with modern 
scholarship. This research has examined an attempt to catch up to more advanced technological 
systems in the technological modernization of the 1950s and 1960s, emphasizing technology 
transfer and its multiple impacts on the Soviet forestry industry and professional communities. 
Technology transfer served as a means of filling the gaps made by deficiencies of the system. In 
other words, it would help, as the Soviet leadership and specialists expected, import missing 
parts of the technological system.160 In the future, it was hoped that it would lead Soviet forestry 
to a more advanced level, even to be competitive with the West. However, due to ideological 
factors and insufficient infrastructure, a number of state-regulated transfers were not sufficient 
and proved unable to improve the system as a whole.  
The period under consideration witnessed a number of promising inventions in the Soviet 
forestry industry such as continuous pulp cooking and using wood wastes and annual plants in 
production. Specialists aimed to solve such critical problems as outdated techniques, insufficient 
production of pulp, wasting forests and overcutting. Overall, these would help produce more 
high quality pulp as well as save forest resources, i.e. make an important change in the wasteful 
Soviet practices of wood harvesting and production. In practice, not all inventions were 
translated into innovations successfully. In some cases, foreign technology, if transferred as a 
whole, bolstered domestic production while in others, when only separate parts were transferred, 
it was not introduced successfully. Using borrowed experience in order to create the Soviet 
Union’s own innovations was inconsistent and required the accumulation of various resources. 
                                                     
158 Schattenberg, S. (2002). Stalins Ingenieure. Bd. 11, München. 
159 Bruland, K. and D. Mowery. Op. cit., p. 119. 
160 James Cortada says about information ecosystem which formed after the WWII and made possible the movement 
of information, being part of coming globalization. See Cortada, J. (2014). When Knowledge Transfer Goes Global. 
Enterprise & Society, 15(1), pp. 68–102. 
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Overall, three features of the technological system –formulated in this thesis as speed, 
barriers, and partiality – were crucial in the process of modernizing the forestry industry. Again, 
modernization was multi-faceted and did not include only failures, but in general it failed; it did 
not lead the forestry industry to the fore as was expected by the Soviet leadership in the 
beginning of the modernization project. Bringing new technologies required changing 
infrastructure, but the new technologies met the same deficiencies that already hindered 
production. As Thomas Hughes shows, the development of the system, including transfers, 
depends on the interaction of its components. In the Soviet context, this interaction was 
complicated by supplies, ideology and secrecy, poor infrastructure, and restricted communication 
among institutions. 
As this thesis illustrated, Soviet transfer agents – institutions and specialists – used 
various channels for transfer, which meant encounters with Western, in particular, Finnish 
actors. Transfer opened up the possibility of discovering more information about the world 
behind the Iron Curtain and produced non-technological impacts on Soviet actors. For the 
Soviets, it helped equip some plants and instigate research in Soviet enterprises and research 
institutions. It was also beneficial for Finnish producers in terms of economic profit. In sum, 
various contacts across the Iron Curtain demonstrate its permeability and prove that on the micro 
level, the Cold War was not just a confrontation. 
On the basis of examined research works, we might conclude that the modernization 
attempt in the forestry industry followed the general path of a wider modernization process. It 
revealed that the main barriers to development were the endemic shortages in the planned 
economy and the social organization of industry. Modernization of the forestry industry also 
illustrated visions of resource use and industrial innovations for making a wide range of 
products.  
This research contributed to the history of technology transfers from West to East during 
the Cold War and their role in Soviet technological modernization. It also contributed to the 
history of Soviet post-war use of forests and the forestry industry, Cold War studies, and 
Finnish-Soviet relations in the 20th century. It has proved that it is important to analyze many 
factors in their interaction, such as society, technology, management, and environment as they 
are embedded in the same technological system. In the Soviet Union, some components of the 
system remained unchanged and prevented the development of the system. Poor infrastructure, 
the barriers between suppliers, producers, and researchers, and wasteful forest management 
illustrated path dependence in the forestry industry. These problems existed before and during 
the modernization of 1955–1964 and remained afterwards. For modernizers in the modern age, 
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they should be avoided. This might be done by decentralizing political control over technological 
systems and fundamental change in state control over innovations. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1 
The number of workers in industries in the USSR and the Russian republic of the USSR 
(RSFSR), 1950 and 1960 
 
Source: Treivish, A. (2002). Promyshlennost` v Rossii za 100 let. In N. Marfenin, red., Rossiia v 
okruzhaiuchshem mire. Analiticheskii ezhegodnik. Moskva, p. 22. 
 USSR RSFSR 
Branch of industry, number of 
employees, million people, % 
1950 1960 1950 1960 
Total number of workers 13.2 19.7 9.4 13.3 
Electrical energy 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.6 
Fuel 7.7 6.9 5.9 5.2 
Chemical 2.7 3.1 3.0 3.8 
Construction 4.9 7.1 4.1 6.4 
Wood harvesting, wood processing and 
paper 
17.1 12.2 17.8 14.3 
Metallurgic 6.1 7.0 6.4 6.5 
Machinery making and metal-based 
manufacturing 
30.3 30.5 32.4 33.4 
Polygraph 0.9 … 0.8 … 
Consumer goods 15.9 18.2 16.5 17.3 
Food 10.0 9.4 8.5 7.6 
Others 3.0 4.2 3.3 3.9 
Total 100 
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Appendix 2 
Wood harvesting in the Soviet Union in 1949–1961 compared to Europe and the USA. 
 Roundwood, 
million cubic 
meters 
Sawnwood, 
million cubic 
meters 
Woodpulp, 
million cubic 
meters 
 
Paper and 
Paperboard, 
million cubic 
meters 
 
Years 1949 – 
1951  
1959 – 
1961 
1949 – 
1951  
1959 – 
1961 
1949 – 
1951  
1959 –
1961 
1949 – 
1951  
1959 – 
1961 
Europe 293.9      305.8 61.1       70.1 11.6       15.3 11.7       22.2 
USSR 227.2      372.8 49.4       104.6 1.5         3.2 1.4        3.3 
USA 280.3      305.5 101.6     99.0 7.1         15.0 26.5       37.6 
 
Source: Richards, E., ed. (1987).Forestry and the Forest Industries: Past and Future. Dordrecht, pp. 11–
13. 
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Appendix 3 
Share of Finland in Soviet imports of equipment for forestry industry, 1955–1964 
Years 1955  1960  1961  1964  
From 
Finland (thousand 
rubles) 
3'818 9’002 14’814 8’474 
 
TotalfromS
weden, Austria, 
Britain, Italy, 
Poland, France, 
Czechoslovakia, 
Finland, Japan 
(thousand rubles) 
7'991 30’304 39’915 54’621* 
*This year 29’366 was imported from Japan. 
Source: Vneshniaia torgovlia Soiuza SSR za 1961 g. (1962). Moskva, p. 62; Vneshniaia torgovlia Soiuza 
SSR za 1964 g. (1965). Moskva, p. 83. 
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Appendix 4 
The structures of Soviet forestry industry and silviculture administration, 1953–1965 
 
 
 
  
The Ministry of the Forestry and 
Paper Industry (1953–1954) 
The Ministry of the Forestry Industry 
(1954–1957) 
The Ministry of the Paper and 
Woodworking Industry (1954–1957) 
Administrative reform and 
decentralization (1957) 
Centralization 
The Central Committee of the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR on the Forestry, 
Pulp and Paper, Woodworking Industry and 
Silviculture (1962–1963) 
 
The Central Committee of the Gosplan of 
the USSR on the Forestry, Pulp and Paper, 
Woodworking Industry and Silviculture 
(1963–1965) 
 
The Main Administration for 
Silviculture and Forest Protection, 
Glavleskhoz of Soviet republics (1959–
1965) 
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Appendix 5 
A layout of the thesis 
 
 
 
